Standing Firm, on Forbidden Grounds

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*

The Articles contained in this issue are the outgrowth of the Symposium sponsored by the University of San Diego School of Law, and
the Liberty Fund on my book, Forbidden Grounds: The Case
Against Employment Discrimination Laws.' It should be evident
that these Articles express a good deal of disagreement with the thesis that I propounded in that book; namely, that the antidiscrimination laws which prohibit employer discrimination on the grounds of
race, creed, sex, age, handicap, or indeed anything else, should be
removed from the statute books insofar as they apply to private employers in competitive markets. I argued in Forbidden Grounds that
the best set of overall social outcomes would come from a legal order
that tolerated any form of private discrimination or favoritism,
whether practiced by the most vicious and ardent white supremacist
or the most dedicated proponent of diversity or affirmative action.
One major theme of my book is that far more mischief is likely to
come from government enforcement of. any antidiscrimination law,
regardless of its laudable content or its noble aspirations.
Forbidden Grounds was not written on the assumption that the
competitive alternative to the present legal regime will yield perfect
outcomes in all cases, or that markets will eliminate all adverse consequences of discrimination, or indeed of any other social practice
that others might call into question. No set of human institutions
could achieve that result, and none should be asked to try. Nor do I
claim that competitive markets will, or indeed should, eliminate all
forms of discrimination. Quite the opposite. I believe that in any
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complex employment relationship certain forms of private discrimination, certain forms of race, sex, age, and disability discrimination
will continue to survive in various quarters, but that invidious forms
of discrimination will not. One tendency of competitive markets is to
drive out inefficient forms of behavior, with discrimination as with
anything else. The appropriate strategy in all cases, therefore, is to
open up markets to new entry as quickly as possible, to eliminate as
many of the impediments on the employment relationship - unemployment taxation, the minimum wage, antidiscrimination law, most
health and safety regulation - and to allow employers and employees to work their separate peace on mutually agreeable terms.
With the thesis just stated, I want to address some of the recurrent challenges to my position that were developed at the Symposium, including those written after the Symposium especially for this
issue. In some cases I shall refer to the individual papers presented
at the Symposium. In others I shall, without attribution, address the
issues that were raised during the course of discussion, issues that
need a principled response. The first half of this Article, therefore,
deals largely with theoretical issues; the second half with empirical
and historical ones. Part I explores the relationship between the utilitarian and libertarian bases of Forbidden Grounds in particular and
of my own work generally. Part II looks at the supposed parallels
between a prohibition on force and fraud on the one hand, and of
discrimination on the other. Part III examines the proper legal response to the psychological harms caused by discrimination. Part IV
addresses the symbolic harms and the social meanings conveyed by
the social tolerance of discriminatory practices. Part V considers the
possible extension of my view to public accommodations, housing
markets, and retail automobile markets. Part VI examines the historical practices of discrimination, both in the South and the North,
before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Finally, part VII,
with an eye toward transferable quotas, asks the troubling question,
where do we go from here? In my view, the intellectual case for the
total repeal of civil rights legislation is made only stronger when all
the objections to Forbidden Grounds are taken into account.
I.

UTILITARIAN OR LIBERTARIAN?

The most insistent theoretical refrain concerned the selection of
the proper philosophical orientation for dealing with the antidiscrimination laws. In particular, Professor Brilmayer's article 2 criticizes the apparent and unprincipled multiplicity of philosophical
2. Lea Brilmayer, Lonely Libertarian: One Man's View of Antidiscrimination
Laws, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105 (1994).
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orientations found in Forbidden Grounds. Her confusion on this subject is quite understandable, I think, given the evolution of my own
legal views over the past twenty or so years. Rather than relate my
slow transformation from a natural rights libertarian to a limited
government utilitarian that has so occurred,' I will content myself
with stating my current position.
At the core of this position is the belief that legal rights are conscious human creations that are designed to maximize the overall
level of utility in society; that the effort should always be made to
create legal institutions which limit the use of public force to those
tasks that are likely to promote broad scale advances in social welfare. The consequence of this legal framework is to yield to two major grounds for social intervention. The cardinal function of the state
is to use public force to control private force, that is, to control individual aggression by one person against the person or property of
another. By way of a corollary, the government should also limit the
practice of various forms of fraud and misrepresentation. The second
state function is to use public force to overcome the transactional
obstacles that prevent voluntary arrangements from exhausting the
potential gains from trade. Thus it becomes appropriate for the state
to take private property for public use, with just compensation compensation that need not be in cash - if the legislation in question provides benefits to each party at least equal to the property
rights that they have surrendered.' The scope of that government
power is extensive on the one hand, but limited on the other. It allows for the use of state power to raise the taxes needed to fund a
police force; and it permits the use of state power to supply a full
range of public (nondivisible) goods and to control the behavior of
private monopolies. Yet by the same token it prevents the use of
government power, whether through taxation, regulation, or the
modification of liability rules to take property, in whole or in part,
from one party to give it to another.5

3. See Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 713 (1989).
4. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 195-215 (1985) [hereinafter TAKINGS].
5. In its most extreme form this position prevents all forms of redistribution from
one person to another. Such was the position that I adopted in Takings. Id. A fallback
position is one that allows redistribution from rich to poor, and then only through the use
of general tax revenues. The merits of these two positions (between which I continue to
vacillate) require an extensive evaluation, but are largely irrelevant to any critique of the
antidiscrimination laws.
HARV.

The exact contours of these government powers are of direct relevance to this inquiry. It supplies the reason why the state should be
allowed, indeed required, to use its force to prevent private violence
by any individual or group against any other group. This position
also explains why state prohibitions against monopolies may be appropriate. In all cases, it is necessary to ask whether the cost of controlling these private forms of misconduct is greater than the harms
prevented. But with competitive markets, such as those that characterize most employment relationships, neither justification is available to the state. Under those circumstances, the thesis of Forbidden
Grounds is that the process of mutual exchange within a system of
well-developed property rights will yield better outcomes than any
system of government intervention.
This basic framework is not libertarian in any thoroughgoing philosophical sense because it does not treat individual autonomy and
mutual exchange as the bedrock values of a system of legal rules.
But since any theoretical discussion of the antidiscrimination principle for private parties only arises after the problems of force, fraud,
and monopoly have been solved, or at least put to one side, it is now
appropriate to evaluate individual cases within the framework of the
derived libertarian principle that stresses the strong nature of property rights and that treats freedom of contract with the same respect
that it treats any other form of freedom, be it of action, conscience,
or speech. 6 The effort to demonstrate the counterproductive nature
on intervention with the many doctrines of the antidiscrimination
law - the attacks on government limitations of employer testing, on
insurance, on mandatory retirement, on reasonable accommodation
for disabilities - all gain their salience because they underscore the
central premise of the book: when force, fraud, and monopoly are no
longer in issue, state intervention results in net social losses, ones
which can be demonstrated by a close examination of those practices
required or prohibited under the current law.
In a sense, therefore, Forbidden Grounds presents a simpler analytical problem than I addressed in Takings: Private Property and
the Power of Eminent Domain,' for Takings seeks to resolve a set of
problems that in principle never arises in a purely libertarian world:
what are the uses and limits of forced exchanges. When Professor
Brilmayer writes at painful length that she cannot tell whether my
6. I do not mean to suggest that there are no differences among the freedoms. It is
far easier to subject property and contract to regulation upon payment of just compensation than it is to subject speech or conscience, even though the latter are not absolute.
But for these purposes the basic point concerns not the ultimate level of protection but
the initial level of respect that is accorded. Too often claims for deprivation of property
and contract never receive any constitutional hearing at all.
7. TAKINGS, supra note 4.
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philosophical orientation was utilitarian or libertarian,8 she only displayed her unfamiliarity with my work - pardonable in anyone who
is not committed to discrediting it. When she then tried, also at
great length, to distinguish categorically between a libertarian position and a freedom of contract position, 9 she displayed her basic ignorance of the libertarian tradition. All libertarians support freedom
of contract: the central prohibition against force and fraud is concerned with the external imposition of legal obligations. There is no
prohibition against the assumption of obligations by consent, for to
be free today requires the ability to bind one's self tomorrow.
Whatever weaknesses readers may find in Forbidden Grounds, it is
consistent in its philosophical approach.
II.

FORCE, FRAUD, AND DISCRIMINATION

A second question that was constantly raised at the Symposium
was whether it was possible to develop a conceptual framework that
placed both force and fraud on the list of prohibited activities while
keeping private discrimination off that list. The argument that I developed in Forbidden Grounds withstood, I believe, the attacks that
were made against it. 10 The prohibition against force starts with the
simple Hobbesian insight that all of us value our own survival and
bodily integrity more than we value our ability to deprive other people of life or limb. It is therefore conceivable to construct a rational
social contract whereby all parties renounce the use of force against
all others, even though it is painfully clear that no express agreement
to that effect could ever emerge from ordinary voluntary contracts
that bind all members of society simultaneously.
In his contribution to this volume Professor McAdams chides me
in harsh terms for placing any reliance on Hobbesian conceptions to
account for my own, limited government view of the world.' He
notes both that ordinary consent cannot explain the operation of the
social contract, and that in any event Hobbes himself was committed
to an absolutist sovereign who could do whatever he chose, including
imposing commands far more onerous than those contained in Title
VII. His objection misses on both points. Forbidden Grounds was
not directed to the question of political obligation, but assumed that
8. Brilmayer, supra note 2, at 107-09.
9. Id. at 109-11.
10. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 28-78.
11. Richard H. McAdams, Epstein on His Own Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
241, 242-47 (1994).

the state was in place. Takings was directed to that issue, and in it I
described at length why I thought that, although Hobbes had set out
the problem of political governance in its starkest form, a Lockean
solution was far preferable to the one that Hobbes himself proposed.
Such was the burden 12of chapter 2 of Takings, entitled Hobbesian
Man, Lockean World.
Had Professor McAdams bothered to consult Takings he would
have understood what I thought was plain enough from Forbidden
Grounds itself: my invocation of Hobbes was addressed to the question why government was instituted among men, and not to the issue
of what form of government should be instituted. It is simply false to
argue that I "have sought to reinterpret or reformulate the argument
of Leviathan to justify a government with some liberal protection of
individual rights."' 13 Nor did I make the elementary confusion between actual consent and the apparent consent in social contracts, a
distinction that others have repeatedly exposed. 4 To the contrary,
my discussion in Takings criticized Locke for placing too much
weight on the idea of consent, and urged that the just compensation
formulation in the takings clause (which rests on the private law
analogies to restitution) offers a more promising way to understand
the forced exchanges necessary to make any social contract theory
work."
McAdams' misguided salvo to one side, how do we breath life into
this social contract? Initially, the prohibition on the use of force is
the central component of the transaction, but it is important to understand just what this entails. Initially, the social contract need not
be one that strips away all natural advantages from those persons
endowed with special skills or strengths. That object of apparent
equality could be achieved, without obtaining peace, by forcing individuals to struggle with each other in mortal combat under a handicap system that equalizes the chances of success, but otherwise
places no limitations on human behavior. Quite the opposite, all natural differences between persons in temperament, talents, tastes, and
strength are preserved (so as to maximize the potential gains from
12. TAKINGS, supra note 4, at 7-18. The first sentence of chapter 2 reads: "It may
be odd to find in Hobbes, the defender of absolute sovereign power, one of the fathers of
our constitutional system." Id. at 7. Gregory Kavka's view of Hobbes is much more fully
delineated than my own, but from my reading of his excellent book, I do not think that
there is much difference between us on what Hobbes meant, even though we might well
disagree on what emendations should be made to Hobbes' basic theory. See GREGORY S.
KAVKA. HOBBESIAN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY (1986).
13. McAdams, supra note 11, at 244.
14. For one recent expos6 of the dominance in consent, see Russell Hardin, The
Morality of Law and Economics, 11 LAW & PHIL. 331 (1992). Again I have no disagreement on this point with Hardin, and only amazement that McAdams thinks that I
do.
15. TAKINGS, supra note 4, at 13-14.
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investment, labor, and trade) once the peace is secured. The reason
there is in practice such a great affinity between classical utilitarians
and social contract theorists is that both are after the same objective.
The social contract theorist uses the logic of mutual exchange to devise arrangements that maximize utility for its participants. The utilitarian quickly realizes that general rules controlling force are the
most urgent task that faces any social order, but also understands
the importance of rules facilitating the gains from trade. Either way,
the mutual renunciation of force is by itself a comprehensive peace
treaty, not the first stage in some larger social transition to a Rawlsian world in which all natural differences are treated as morally
arbitrary and morally irrelevant.
The question then arises whether this mutual renunciation of force
carries with it the conviction attributed to it by social contract theorists. Lest anyone doubt that conclusion, I invite him or her to reside
permanently in Hobbesian Gardens, where the conditions of the
state of nature will be scrupulously observed so as to prevent these
hardy denizens from ever concluding a binding contract of peace
among themselves. There are many persons who in idle discussion
might reserve the right to live in such a place, or insist that souls
hardier than themselves might choose to enter. But there are virtually none who would, if push came to shove, walk through that gate;
and if they did, they would not be able to produce offspring who
could carry forward their vision into the next generation. No amount
of verbal fencing or clever deconstruction (just what do you mean by
force and aggression, anyhow?) will induce anyone to alter their conclusion, and live so lonely and dangerous a life.
Fraud of course is a somewhat harder case. Every person has one
additional layer of protection against some forms of fraud: don't believe the con artist. But if given free rein, deception can be so cleverly crafted as to escape detection. Worse still, in this world people
have only weak defenses against deception and intrigue committed
behind their backs on the gullible, preoccupied, or indifferent. There
are too many accounts of loyal servants of the Crown who have been
led to slaughter by the false witness of a faithless royal advisor. Defamation at its worst is a deliberate lie with horrific consequences and the fraud is always whispered about behind the victim's back,
but not told to his face. A mutual renunciation of that tactic is
surely within the scope of any sensible social contract theory, especially when it is recognized that fraud is often used as an aid to
force, as a way to disarm any determined resistance by an artful

campaign of disinformation: "these are not gas chambers, but showers," was a line used more than once, and with deadly effect. The
challenge that I made at the Symposium is again put forward to
readers to ponder for themselves: if given the choice to live in a
world (a) without protection against force and fraud, or (b) without
protection from a failure or refusal to deal, or otherwise discriminate
on the grounds of race, sex, age, or disability, which would you pick?
That answer seems too clear to admit any doubt, and it is important to recall briefly why: force leaves one exposed to the worst enemy, and once a contract is made, to the next worst and so on down
the line. Fraud likewise requires you to guard against those who
would take from you under pretext instead of coercion; and it exposes all of us to the machinations of strangers. The refusal to deal
leaves one free to choose another trading partner, free of compulsion
and deliberate misinformation, and at most exposes us to a psychological sting, of which a great deal was made at the Symposium, and
which I address in part III. But the failure or refusal of X to deal
with you leaves you free to deal with A, B, or C. And th6 discrimination against you by X still allows you to take that offer if it is in your
own interest to do so, as it might often be. These perils pose no
threat to the social order, and it is not simply mere historical contingency that the legal concern with private discrimination arose only
after it was thought that all persons were secure against force and
fraud.
My efforts to erect a sharp difference between force and fraud, on
the one hand, and private discrimination on the other have also met
with resistance in these pages. McAdams, for example, places the
term "force" in quotation marks because following or watching people in public places 1could
constitute "force." Why not then, he asks,
6
the refusal to deal?
It is, however, unwise to trouble ourselves unduly with some intermediate cases. "Shadowing" another person falls very close to the
line, but it is conduct which in extreme cases can make people suffer
from extreme insecurity, and, so limited, it has rightly been held actionable.17 More generally, the line between permitted speech or conduct and an implicit threat of force is a vexed one that confronts
every liberal theory. It is worth noting that no fully satisfactory approach to labor and protest picketing has ever been developed because of the difficulty of locating the precise line between a peaceful
16. McAdams, supra note 11, at 244 n.11. He also notes the danger of "ritual
shunning or social ostracism," id., which are taken up infra pp. 18-22.
17. See Nader v. General Motors, 255 N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970) ("[I]t is
manifest that the mere observation of the plaintiff in a public place does not amount to
an invasion of his privacy. But, under certain circumstances, surveillance may be so
'overzealous' as to render it actionable.").
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expression of disagreement on the one hand and an implicit threat of
force on the other. I" The judgments in question are necessarily contextual, and inevitably some cases will fall close to the line. But not
here: shadowing another individual is the antithesis of ignoring him,
and nowhere in the history of the labor relations or the First Amendment has anyone ever held that a refusal to associate with another
individual amounts to an implicit threat of force against that person.
Nor does McAdams advance his case by his discussion of Hobbes'
view on "dishonoring."' 19 In the Hobbesian context, dishonoring an
individual means according them less by way of respect than they
think they deserve. The passage that McAdams quotes gives a fair
rendition of the Hobbesian position, but it does little to advance his
argument.20 One consequence of that dishonoring is that it could
lead to resentment, and resentment in turn could lead to violence.
McAdams then takes a leap to the position that we must prevent
discrimination on the grounds of race in order to forestall the use of
violence by those who feel (rightly, in his view) aggrieved by the
slights that they have been made to suffer. "Where Epstein says that
an act of 'dishonoring' someone is not force - the victim still retains
his 'life, limb, and possession' - Hobbes is keenly interested in the
fact that it will predictably lead to the use of force."'" The bottom
line is that "Hobbes' work provides considerable reason for thinking
that, when they dishonor,
refusals-to-deal are a powerful threat to
'22
order.
social
the
The quotations from Hobbes are not wrested from context, but
McAdams' singular conclusion surely is. The first point is that Hobbes himself nowhere says that he would support any such theory that
makes the refusal to deal a private wrong because it could lead to

18. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Vegalahn v. Guntner, 44
N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896). For my views, see Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for
Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357
(1983).
19. McAdams, supra note 11, at 247-48.
20. McAdams quotes from Hobbes:
For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate
he sets upon himselfe; And upon all signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each
other,) to extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage; and from
others, by the example.
Id. at 245 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 88 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991)).
21. McAdams, supra note 11, at 247 (footnote omitted).
22. Id. at 245.

the use of force in retaliation. After all, he is the most powerful exponent of the proposition that the value is subjective and the contracts should be entered into only when each side thinks that it gains
more from an exchange than it loses. The antidiscrimination laws
are suspect, in part, because they replace a regime of mutual gain
with one of forced association. Worse still, McAdams' own conclusion does not follow logically from Hobbesian premises. People feel
dishonored for all sorts of reasons - for it is rare that the rest of
mankind thinks as well of me as I think of myself. And one can be
undervalued for reasons that have to do with low estimations of one's
abilities, or disrespect for one's taste in arts. If dishonor may lead to
force, then any expression of sentiment could be prohibited on this
ground. An affirmative action program dishonors white males; its repudiation dishonors women and minorities. One party dishonors by
refusing to hire another; yet the second person could dishonor the
first by taking a job that the other does not want him to have. The
cycle never ends, for all acts involve some form of dishonor and all,
therefore, are prohibited.
So silly a position is not contemplated by Hobbes nor anyone else.
The obvious rejoinder is that people should always seek to avoid insults and slights - a lesson from which McAdams could profit but the legal prohibition should be directed at the initial use of force,
not the disrespectful words that precede it. The English law of assault, from Hobbes' day to the present, has long insisted that "mere
words do not constitute an assault" unless there is some offer of
force. 3 And the modern constitutional law makes it quite clear that
racial epithets, far more ugly than a simple refusal to deal, are not
actionable under the First Amendment unless they fall within the
narrow class of "fighting words, ' 24 that is, words that once again
raise the specter of the imminent use of force. McAdams' tortured
logic does not justify the creation of an antidiscrimination law, but
renders it unconstitutional under the First Amendment. And even if
this argument justified Title VII, it could not do so selectively. Virtually all human conduct to which others take exception would have to
be banned as well. Dishonoring, then, provides no way to expand the
set of prohibitions against the use of force or fraud.
Professor Evan Tsen Lee also attacks the force and fraud line as

23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 31 cmt. a (1965).
24. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); see Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972) (unconstitutional to punish racial epithets that do not "'have a

direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark
is addressed.' ") (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573). For yet another example of
egregious misconduct held protected under the First Amendment, see Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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underinclusive.25 But, properly understood, his asserted counter-examples only show the strength of the basic theory. A prohibition
against the harboring of known felons may be a "consensual activity" that does no harm to the parties to it, but it is rendered illegal
because it makes the apprehension of criminals more difficult than it
ought to be: a serious third party effect. And drag races are stopped
because of the obvious risks that they pose to other persons using the
public highways. Likewise "fraud" is not simply a problem of imperfect information; nor is it just a subspecies of mutual mistake. It
involves a deliberate manipulation of known information for private
advantage. Often, fraud can disarm individuals so that they are unable to resist the actions of aggression by others.
The line between force and fraud on the one hand, and other
forms of conduct on the other, is not perfectly hard-edged, but the
doubts on intermediate cases should not be allowed to undermine the
obvious conclusion that a refusal to deal never amounts to the use of
force or fraud. Perhaps the law should treat certain refusals to deal
as wrong, but if so, then the substantive grounds for that decision
must be fully revealed and not hidden behind weak terminological
arguments. By the same token, however, the case against the antidiscrimination laws is not established simply by showing discrimination
is not a species of force and fraud. Nor is it clinched by showing
that the case for an antidiscrimination law is weaker than the case
for a prohibition on force and fraud. It may still be that all persons
would think themselves better off with the mutual renunciation of
the right to discriminate in exchange for the right to be free from
discrimination by others. The formal possibility is there, but the underlying scenario cannot be demonstrated effectively. Pacts for mutual renunciation do not necessarily promise net social gain,
independent of what is renounced. The mutual renunciation of hard
work, good fun, or sexual pleasure may require no more from one
than it does from another; but it could easily lead to the ruin of both.
A universal antidiscrimination norm surely cannot be so obviously
dismissed, but in the end the case for it falls of its own weight. The
default position in the absence of a prohibition against force is ceaseless conflict: the gains from social order exceed the resources that
must be devoted to maintaining it. The default position in a world
without a prohibition against fraud is one with public lies and private deceits. The default position in a world without some antitrust
25.

Evan Tsen Lee, Epstein's Premises, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 203, 204 (1994).

protection is one in which some industries (but not all) will be
marked by cartels and monopoly. The default position in a world
without an antidiscrimination provision is a well-functioning competitive market. In the simplest terms, where are the gains that might
justify the antidiscrimination law on the strength of the abstract antidiscrimination principle?
Professor Lee puzzles over the question of whether these gains are
matters of perception or matters of reality.2" In practice it is of
course hard to separate them out, just as it is hard to know whether
the basic social commitment to the maintenance of order rests on
perception or reality. But over time and with discussion, one hopes
that a better appreciation of these issues will bring perception into
conformity with reality. I recognize that the current political sentiments are in favor of the maintenance of the law. It is, therefore,
important to recognize that the benefits they are said to produce are
themselves difficult to identify or quantify.
Lee and others seek to identify these gains in the induced spur for
minorities to invest in human capital.27 But there is no theoretical
reason to believe that this claim is true, relative to a competitive
market. If the overall levels of output are lower under an antidiscrimination law than without them, then the total returns to education should increase from the expanded opportunities created by the
repeal of the antidiscrimination laws. Why expect that any group
will not be able to find its own niche in this larger pie? From the
individual point of view, moreover, the presence of an antidiscrimination law, especially one that treats certain classes of individuals as "protected," could have precisely the opposite effect: it could
induce people of ability not to give that extra effort because they
think that they have it "made" anyhow. It is, therefore, not surprising that the empirical studies on the issue have not found any strong
correlation between the employment discrimination laws and the investment in human capital, and that the increased investments that
blacks made in education before the passage of the Civil Rights Acts
show that market forces even in adverse circumstances can stimulate
major investments in human capital. And with the current shortage
of black Ph.D.s 28 in a world of intensive affirmative action, there is
26. Id. at 204-05.
27. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, 8 Soc.
PHIL. & POL. 22, 29 (1990). After raising the basic point, Sunstein notes that the empirical evidence tends to cut the other way: "Blacks and women frequently appear to invest
huge amounts of human capital even in sectors that treat them inhospitably." Id. The
explanation might be that if one expects hostile treatment, then it pays to be a bit better
to overcome the poor reception. It is only if one thinks that opportunities are well-nigh
hopeless that no investment will be made, and even then the investment in human capital
may shift to another sector, not disappear altogether.
28. Frank James, Black Ph.D.s Too Rare in America, CH. TRIB., Feb. 2, 1994, at
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little reason to think that Title VII has had or will have much, if any
beneficial, effect on this score.
Nor do the supposed gains from Title VII come from the possible
improvements that Title VII might make in the search process. McAdams asserts that black workers will be at a real disadvantage if
only ten percent of the firms wish to hire them, but he seriously confuses the relevant economic issues. Thus, at times he veers unfortunately between the extremes of perfect ignorance and perfect
information, when the true situation is surely in between.2" And at
all times he writes as though the extensive affirmative action programs that are commonplace today had vanished from the earth.
Nor does he understand that the effectiveness of a labor market for
all participants will increase with the ease of entry and the dissemination of information. So long as employers are denied the kinds of
information on which to make individuated judgments, so long as
termination of new employees is clouded by legal complications, the
search process will be worse for all employees than in an unregulated
market. Unfortunately, the civil rights acts have added layers of
complication far beyond those that could be created by any private
market. Search today is far more difficult than ever before, and for
all workers.
Finally, the social gains do not come in the increased administrative costs needed to operate any motive-based test of discrimination:
the line between discrimination and incompetence is hard to police,
and in principle every decision on hiring, promotion, and firing can
now be second guessed. Nor do the gains come by using heavyhanded disparate impact tests to obviate the need for these motivebased inquiries that are themselves so costly and unreliable. Nor do
Al (noting that the number of black Ph.D.s is down 10% in the past decade and hovers
around 2.5 % of the total Ph.D.s given). James quotes Frank Morris of Morgan State as
saying it's an "outrage" that scholarship funds go to foreign students, as if there were
enough Americans, black or white, for scientific studies. Id. Thus, the Ph.D.s that are
granted to blacks tend to be concentrated in certain disciplines such as education and
social work. See Michael Hirschorn, The Doctorate Dilemma: Why There Aren't
Enough Black Professors, NEW REPUBLIC, June 6, 1988, at 24, 26. "In 1986 no blacks
earned Ph.D.s in geometry, astronomy, astrophysics, acoustics, theoretical chemistry, geology, aerospace engineering, or computer engineering." Id. More generally, blacks constituted less than one half of one percent of the science Ph.D.s. Over half the 1986 black
Ph.D.s were in education. Note that the total number of black Ph.D.s was down 26
percent from a decade earlier. Id.; see also Peter Applebome, Goal Unmet, Duke Reveals
Perils in Effort to Increase Black Faculty, N.Y. Timns, Sept. 19, 1993, § 1, at I (the
original 1988 Duke plan called for each of its 56 departments to have a black member by
1993; only eight departments reached that goal).
29. McAdams, supra note 11, at 251.

these gains come from making it impossible for firms to offer differential wage packages to take into account differential costs (e.g.,
higher injury rate, or lower customer satisfaction and the like) of one
person against another. If it costs ten dollars per period to provide
support for employee A and fifty dollars per period for employee B,
the modern antidiscrimination law requires the employer to ignore
this difference if (say) one worker is white and the other is black,
but allows him to take it into account if both employees are of the
same race.
These endless complications are, as Christopher Wonnell suggests,
not simple matters of implementation that can be corrected in some
technical revision of the Act and its administration.3" Rather, the
risk of overreaching on civil rights issues is endemic to the enterprise
itself. In a world in which concerns about autonomy and property
are at a low ebb, power will pass into the hands of powerful interest
groups. Once that happens, we should expect the consequence that
Wonnell has noted: the law will be used "more as a sledgehammer
than a fine tuning device." 31 A mild and moderate civil rights act is
never in the cards.
These endless difficulties of definition and implementation reveal, I
believe, a fundamental flaw in any effort to use social contract theory
to formulate an antidiscrimination law. Each effort to make any contract or any choice necessarily involves discrimination: how else does
one decide whom to marry, where to live, what to eat, or what to do?
Any law that forbids all forms of discrimination is so hopelessly
broad as to forbid all forms of self-expression and human action. So
the statute must be confined to invidious forms of discrimination,
and these only of employers, but never of employees, who retain all
their other rights of choice no matter how corrupt the grounds of
decision. So now the question is what forms of discrimination are
invidious.
At the Symposium there was some consensus that the cases that
fell within the "core" prohibition were discrimination on the grounds
of race or sex. The ever-prudent Professor Andrew Kull urges in his
brief Article that I moderate my position, abandon the frontal attack
that calls for total repeal of the civil rights law, and stress the evident differences that exist between race, with its history of slavery,
and the newer forms of "forbidden grounds" that have been added to
the list.32 Yet how does one proceed with prudence as a guide? On
30. Christopher T. Wonnell, Was the Corruption of the Civil Rights Law Inevitable?, 31 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 269, 271-74 (1994).
31. Id. at 270. Wonnell uses the phrase to refer to the effort of the law to reduce
the number of mistakes in making decisions based on individual talents. Id. But it applies
to the overall operation of the law as well.
32. Andrew Kull, The Discrimination Shibboleth, 31 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 195
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the question of discrimination by sex, at one point Kull notes it is
quite different from race discrimination because it was not supported
by a Jim Crow regime, 33 and at another point that it is just another
form of invidious discrimination.3 4 Yet even to have honest doubts on
the question of sex discrimination removes Kull from the political
mainstream and puts him in the class of persons branded as extremists scarcely better than myself.
There is still the matter of political realism, which also cuts both
ways. When Kull expresses well-founded doubts about disability and
age discrimination, he fails to recall that there were no representatives of the-disabled at the meeting, and that the oldest people in
attendance at the Symposium were in their early to mid-fifties.
Change the composition of the group and the definition of the core of
discrimination will change with it. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)36 and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) 6 both enjoy enormous Congressional majorities, backed up
by well-oiled political machines who claim insistently that discrimination on either of these grounds is just as invidious as discrimination on grounds of race or sex. The legislative response gives ample
evidence of their clout: the sheer financial dislocations that are required to comply with the ADEA and the ADA are far higher than
any similar requirements under the original Civil Rights Act of
1964. No one is entitled to make reasonable accommodations under
Title VII,3 7 even though these are aggressively demanded under the
ADA. 38 If age and disability fall outside the "core," then what accounts for their success, and how do we decide what falls within it?
At this point one can see the weakness of Kull's strategy. Having
yielded on the fundamental point of freedom of association, he is left
with the construction of halfway houses and makeshift defenses that
will seem attractive to some people and some interest groups, and
(1994).
33. Id. at 197-98.
34. Id. at 198 (treating invidious racial discrimination as the core of the statute).
Note that the drafters of the 1964 Act saw a difference between the two cases because
the bona fide occupational qualification defense applied only to sex, and not to race. 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (West 1981).
35. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-34 (West 1985
& Supp. 1994).
36. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-213 (West
Supp. 1994).
37. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17 (West 1981 & Supp. 1994).
38. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

totally unacceptable to others. He will in the end be utterly unable
to present any coherent view of the world that will decide to stop
application of the antidiscrimination principle here instead of there.
Yet none of those difficulties arises in a world in which forced association in competitive markets is categorically condemned. Even after
legal force is withdrawn from this area, it does not follow that moral
discourse cannot continue. Persons who think that race and sex are
different can arrange their affairs to reflect that judgment; others
who think that disabilities and age are special problems can incline
their efforts in that direction. The process is not buffeted by the
harsh winds of majority politics, but allows for independent judgments such that small differences in popular mood can be registered
by small differences in employment practices, without political jolts
and discontinuities, and without the runaway tendencies of administrative agencies.
But it will be said that this approach ignores the enormous level of
national consensus on the ostensible universality of the antidiscrimination principle, at least insofar as it applies to those core cases
of race and sex (and which in practice covers age and disability as
well). This point was in part acknowledged in Forbidden Grounds,
which addressed just these issues in its introduction, entitled Consensus and Its Perils. But in a sense that characterization of the current
situation gives too much away to the supposed harmony of status
quo, for it masks the powerful and unyielding divisions of opinion
about what should be the full shape of the law. Those who support
color-blindness believe that private employers should not discriminate against any person on the ground of color. Yet by the same
token they will not support any color-blind norm for employees who
are allowed to discriminate as much as they like no matter how ignoble or invidious their motives. On the other hand, many supporters of
affirmative action believe that it is permissible, and indeed desirable,
to discriminate in favor of certain persons because of their race or
sex. Affirmative action is not some minor perturbation of some universal antidiscrimination principle. It is not like a rule that says that
even though the use of force against a stranger is prohibited, force
used in self-defense is not. That substantive exception to the basic
rule is consistent with its overall objective because it exempts no person from his basic legal obligations, and because it also reduces the
total amount of force that will be used for aggressive purposes. For
its part, the proponents of affirmative action are saying that the core
prohibition applies to some but not all people for a variety of circumstances - contingent, historical, and programmatic - that defy
simple categorization as part of any universal principle.
Worse still, even those who believe in some deviation from the antidiscrimination principle are at hopeless loggerheads as to what the
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permissible exceptions should provide: what groups are entitled to
preferential treatment; how much discrimination is appropriate; how
long should it last; what social conditions; who should bear its costs?
Does special treatment only allow persons to enter on favorable
terms into large social groups, or does it also permit them to exclude
others on grounds that they deem satisfactory? Over and over the
questions were put: may religious employers insist that their employees participate in morning prayers? May Native American Indian
Tribes have special workplaces for their members? May women
choose female doctors? May Polish firms hire Polish workers? The
answers one hears are always equivocal and evasive, seeking time,
asking for clarification, making distinctions, mumbling excuses, and
pleading for some reasonable, if undefined, accommodation. It is
easy to see why: does it matter whether one deals with a main line
religion or a fringe group? Does it matter if the physician is an obstetrician or an eye doctor? Does it matter whether the firm caters to
clients who speak only Polish? And so on. The easy cases in which
discrimination might painlessly be prohibited are the cases where it
is not likely to be practiced. Why then institutionalize a process that
requires fine-spun justifications in individual cases?
Still, the usual response is to try to work the cases out one at a
time. I cannot find any good reason for the usual guilt, embarrassment, and hesitation that divides the champions of the antidiscrimination principle. The proper answer in all cases is that the
principle of freedom of association allows all persons to choose their
associates on the terms that they see fit. Whether I am pleased or
offended at their choices is something that I am allowed to voice; it
is something which might inspire me to refuse to deal with those who
engage in practices that I deplore; and it may encourage me to persuade others to follow my lead, even perhaps to the extent of an
organized campaign of picketing and boycotts, although these practices often come close to using force and intimidation. But discrimination by others does not afford me, or a majority sympathetic with
my position, any grounds for coercing persons who disagree with my
conclusion. The theory of mutual renunciation lends no support to
any form of antidiscrimination law against private employers. It
points strongly toward the principle of freedom of contract, not only
for employers, but for all persons who wish to make gainful associations, regardless of status.

III.

PSYCHOLOGICAL HARMS

Another criticism frequently hurled against Forbidden Grounds
ith scant regard for the emotional tranquillity of its author was that its overemphasis on the economic logic of competition revealed a regrettable ignorance of the psychological and symbolic effects of being rejected on the grounds of race or sex, especially for
women and for members of minority groups. I think that my emphasis on the economic issues was surely consistent with the original impulse behind the 1964 Act, whose supporters were concerned with
the loss in social productivity from what they regarded as an irrational exclusion of blacks from ordinary labor markets. Senator
Clark said, "Economics is at the heart of the racial situation."39 And
there was every reason to take him at his word.
Today's new emphasis on psychological harm should not be seen
as a sign of strength, but rather as borne of the failure of the Civil
Rights Act to deliver the economic benefits promised of it by its
sponsors. The difficulties with high rates of black unemployment, especially among youths, the decline in overall levels of educational
achievement, the rise in malaise, and the increase in criminal conduct are certainly features of the last thirty years, and none can be
laid at the doorsteps of the isolated and silent opponents of the antidiscrimination laws. Indeed, I would argue that many of the reforms of the past thirty years have backfired in just the same way as
the antidiscrimination laws: the higher social security and employment taxes, and the increase in minimum wage are some obvious
candidates. But whatever the origins of today's social ills, these massive social failures render the classical justifications for the antidiscrimination laws far less compelling than they might once have
appeared. Further, they have spurred the search for alternative justifications to fill the gap. The appeal to psychological harms is -an effort to bring cases of failure or refusal to deal, or of discrimination,
into the secure folds of external harm, where liability was traditionally awarded under the tort law. It reminds us again just how offensive many people find some discriminatory practices, whether done
overtly or covertly.
In order to illustrate the level of harms involved, Professor Lani
Guinier (before her subsequent fame) recounted a then recent incident told to her by an upper-middle class black professional woman
of impeccable credentials, who had been falsely arrested for shoplifting by a lower-middle class white security guard, and who was led
out of the store in handcuffs to public ridicule. The description of
these events is surely deplorable, but what does it tell us about the
-

39. 110 CONG. REC. 13080 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark). For some additional
evidence, see FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 159-81.
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problem of discrimination in employment? Initially, it is critical to
point out that this is not a case that goes without redress under the
legal rules that I have defended. False arrest, false imprisonment,
intentional infliction of emotional distress by extreme and outrageous
conduct are all properly recognized as common law torts, wholly
without regard to the race of either the plaintiff or defendant.
If the question is whether legal relief is available, then we can
consult a well established body of legal rules. At one level the case
seems to fall far short of the requirements of the tort of extreme and
outrageous misconduct, if only because the defendant's servant had a
good faith belief that some offense had been committed and agreed
to an immediate release once informed of the error by well-intentioned customers who had witnessed the entire affair.40 And actions
for false imprisonment and defamation may be complicated by the
existence of privileges that exist with good faith and probable
cause.41 Whatever misfortune happened to that woman, however,
falls far short of the loss of life, limb, and bodily function. A case of
false detention is at best on the borderland of the tort law; it is not
at its core. "Against a large part of the frictions and irritations of
clashing of temperaments incident to participation in a community
life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection
than the law could ever be." 42
The obvious rejoinder is that this analysis is itself insensitive if
only because it does not take into account the race, sex, and social
class of the participants. It might be yet another instance where I
"just don't get it," with the "it" having some self-evident antecedent.
Yet for the slow afoot like myself, it is just not so clear what that
added dimension is, for no one greets arrest and public humiliation
with equanimity. When I related Gaunier's story to a white male law
professor, he commented that he had recently been led away by a
security guard when he set off the burglar alarm while leaving a
drugstore. It seemed as though a bottle of aspirin had fallen into the
hood of his down jacket and had tripped off the alarm, which led to
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). "Liability has been found
only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as
to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community." Id. at cmt. d.
41. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 94B (West Supp. 1994) (codifying common law defense in false imprisonment actions for reasonable detentions for reasonable grounds); see Coblyn v. Kennedy's Inc., 268 N.E.2d 860 (Mass. 1971) (relying
on the statutory privilege in a case where apprehension led to mild heart attack).
42. Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936).

his being taken into custody by a security guard. His response to the
entire episode was one of deep humiliation and genuine fear, and
whatever understanding he possessed about constitutional law or
standard form contracts was of little assistance in dealing with the
personal risk at hand. And he didn't think that it much mattered
that he was white; the security guard black, the store owner Hispanic. It was coming within a hair's breadth of arrest for a crime he
had not done that created the tangible sense of terror. I know that I
can empathize with his predicament because I too would feel powerless in that situation; law degrees and scholarly publications do not
help. I cannot say whether my friend's fear or anguish was greater
than that of a black woman also falsely apprehended, but for these
purposes at least it hardly matters. These comparisons are always
difficult to make, but the one perspective that is surely wrong is a
baseline that treats white men as impervious to psychological harms
stemming from false arrest.
Viewed in this light, ignoring simmering issues of race, class, and
sex is not a vice of the legal analysis, but a hidden strength. It would
be quite ungainly and mischievous for the legal system to calibrate
its rules on false arrest, for example, with a large matrix to take into
account all the permutations of race, sex, and social class (of which
only sex is dichotomous). The ability to formulate legal rules by conduct and not by status was thought by Aristotle to be one of the
hallmarks of an advanced system of corrective justice, and his basic
argument of the irrelevance of certain key social categories to legal
analysis is surely correct. 43 It may well be that one wants to speak at
length on this incident as a reflection of the poor state to which race
relations have sunk in America, or even to insist that there is some
special pain that must be acknowledged in certain settings and denied in others. But if so, then one must be still more critical. It is
worth noting, in Professor Guinier's example, that all the other participants to the scene testified on behalf of the arrested woman and
did not seek to cover-up for a coemployee. It certainly would be important to know how she was treated by the police and the magistrate to understand social attitudes on this question, and to know as
well how frequently incidents of this sort happened and why.
Yet with all this said, what does Professor Guinier's case tell us
about the antidiscrimination law in employment? Precisely nothing.
While the matters of race, sex, and class may add power to the narrative account, her story retains much of its punch precisely because
it involves the use of force and public humiliation against the woman
arrested. No story writer, however skillful, could weave together the
elements of a bare failure or refusal to hire on the grounds of race
43.

ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

261-67 (H. Rackham trans., 2d ed. 1962).
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the statutory offense - and preserve its narrative power unless
she did what Professor Guinier did: make vivid the elements of aggression, detention, public humiliation, defamation, and deceit. One
can violate the antidiscrimination law by politely saying that only
persons who meet this standard are eligible for the job: "I am sorry
if you have suffered any inconvenience, and I hope that you will be
able to obtain a position elsewhere." It is against that scenario that
one has to assess the psychological harm: not on the strength of illustrations that themselves draw strength from the libertarian tradition
that the antidiscrimination laws repudiate.
Note too, the further difficulties that do arise whenever the irreducible psychological harm from rejection is treated as a justification
for government intervention. All the old questions about the scope of
discrimination law are revived. Are only members of certain classes
entitled to protection against these forms of harm? Surely all of us
suffer some psychological harm from rejection regardless of race or
sex. Even if the levels of harm differ across these groups, there may
be wide variation within each category so that fragile white males
may be more easily scarred than hard-nosed black females. Surely
the constant continuation and gradation does not easily accommodate any categorical distinction between those whose harm prompts
legal response and those whose harm is met with collective
indifference.
Nor is it evident that these psychological harms are more serious
than others that routinely go without redress. If I am told that I
could not get an academic job because of my political views, I should
be at least as angry as being told that I could not get it because of
my race or sex. If I were subjected to a torrent of personal abuse
during the course of an academic debate I might be more angry because of the aspersions cast on my scholarship than I would be at
some silly statement that nothing a white male says is worth hearing
an objection that has become so trite and stylized so as to lose all
emotive force. And I think that I would be more upset by far at
some public tirade that announced that Jewish doctors were responsible for the spread of the AIDS virus among black persons. But in
none of these cases would the aggressive application of the antidiscrimination law in employment offer the slightest amount of legal
redress.
In general I think that the proper legal response is for all persons
to learn to deal with offensive and rude statements without recourse
-

to law. In some cases the appropriate response is to ignore the challenge; in other cases it is to shout back; in still others is to be calm
and dispassionate (surely not my nature) against the charges. But
although it has been repeatedly said about libertarians that they
would provide legal redress for psychological harms caused by rejection from jobs, 4 no libertarian that I know has ever embraced that
position - and if any has, he should be chastised (not sued) for his
mistake. It should go without saying that where psychological harms
are consequent on the commission of some genuine tort (including
false arrest), then they should be fully compensable under ordinary
tort principles. Once the defendant has crossed the boundaries of
other persons, then the sound legal theory demands nothing less than
complete protection for all forms of harm, regardless of race, to the
extent that it is practicable for the legal system to do so.
IV.

SYMBOLIC AND SOCIAL MEANINGS

The persistent concern over various forms of harm attributable to
discrimination does not stop with the psychological harms to the victims of discrimination. It also extends to the more diffuse social and
symbolic harms that follow from undertaking various forms of discriminatory actions. But again, no coherent theory justifies the public use of force against those whose actions affront those symbols.
The change in emphasis brought on by the symbolic challenge is
not, however, without its difficulties. The original focus of the Civil
Rights Act was on the creation of jobs, the improvement of working
conditions, and the recognition of personal dignity on the job. The
symbolic issue relegates these concerns to an inferior status and
transfers thinking about the Civil Rights Act to the intangible spillover effects of private employment decisions on some larger social
stage. It is as though the private act of discrimination, although lawful between the parties, creates a negative externality that itself justifies a government prohibition against the underlying practice.
Yet to state the point in this fashion is to run into a wholly new
set of obstacles. Quite simply, the revised theory raises serious constitutional problems with freedom of speech. If one person wants to
make a public statement that it is important to have affirmative action hiring in a colorblind legal universe, no one would say that this
speech lost its protection because it sought to undermine a dominant
44. See J. Hoult Verkerke, Free to Search, 105 HARV. L. REv. 2080, 2086 (1992)
(reviewing FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1) ("Epstein claims that the black worker
can simply move on to the next potential employer, thus searching freely for a desirable
job. Surely, however, this account ignores the denigration, frustration and anger that the
victim of discrimination experiences.") (footnote omitted).
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social consensus that was thought constitutive of our national identity. I take it that the Civil Rights of Act of 1964 would have been
unconstitutional on its face if the sole justification for its passage had
been to make it impossible for employers to show symbolic disrespect
for the colorblind norm. Why then, when all else fails, do these symbolic losses become the reason for keeping the prohibition against
discriminatory hiring? Even now, it is surely no violation of Title VII
for someone to argue that the symbolic harms of Title VII are
greater than its symbolic benefits. Even now it is surely no violation
of Title VII for an employer to say that she resents the imposition of
Title VII even as she complies with it in the individual case. Title
VII will not be able to escape a constitutional thicket if it is justified
as a means to exert central public control over the terms of debate
on one of the major issues of our time. The very people who support
Title VII (e.g., the American Civil Liberties Union) have been most
vigorous in their efforts to preserve against all attacks the current
constitutional understanding that deep and sincere private offense by
some citizens offers no justification for stopping other people from
burning their own flags on their own property. 45 Title VII is in deep
trouble indeed if one of its core justifications calls on public force to
control the direction of public debate.
All of this does not necessarily require that everyone turn a deaf
ear to claims of the deep social ills and hurts that are caused by
various forms of social practices. In this regard, it is critical to note
not only the uses, but also the limitations of legal theory. The central
question asked by a legal system is not, do we think that this conduct
is or is not desirable, laudable, benevolent, sensible, or wise? It is the
much more focused and limited question, do we think that this conduct requires the public use of force as a proper social response?
There are all sorts of things that many of us, perhaps all of us, think
fall below the level of minimal acceptable social standards. Any account of social behavior that does not address rudeness, coarseness,
insensitivity, impatience, boorishness, or intolerance is a thin and inadequate account indeed. But for these breaches of social understanding, it is proper and perhaps imperative that a level of social
sanctions, one not backed -

or overwhelmed -

by the public use of

force, be developed. Conversely, any account of social behavior that
does not recognize the virtues of politeness, refinement, empathy, patience, respect, or openness is also sadly deficient.
45.

See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).

With all this said, it does not follow that public force should be
used to punish vice and to advance virtue. Other systems of social
control should occupy that middle ground. With charitable giving,
for example, we are most aware of the large unmarked terrain between compliance with legal norms on the one hand and the complete subjectivity of preferences on the other hand. The long
tradition of imperfect (that is, binding on conscience but not legally
enforceable) obligations 46 is not just double-talk; nor is it just a
transparent excuse to allow cheap and selfish individuals to keep a
tight grip on what they have while others suffer. The obligation matters as an obligation even though it is imperfect. Just because a legal
system is unable to grade and rank preferences in accordance with
their ostensible worth does not require us to be morally indifferent to
the way in which other people lead their own lives, or the way in
which we live ours. There are certain choices (the choice between
vanilla and strawberry ice cream) that may be regarded as purely
private, but there are clearly other choices that do, and should, give
rise to social sanctions.
This point must have some force with respect to the question of
discrimination. The issue is one of enormous concern everywhere
throughout society, and there is nothing that says that just because
all private parties have an absolute right to choose their trading
partners, they should revel in their right to discriminate or to exclude. People who have been on the wrong end of a social interaction
in the one case will assume positions of power and influence in the
next. They are not required to discriminate because the law allows
them to do so. They can work to influence and change the private
institutions of which they are a part to respond to the ills that they
perceive under whatever theory of social meaning they embrace.
They can make the prohibition of certain forms of behavior the defining wrongs of their own organizations without having the state
ram a duplicate set of obligations down the throats of others.
It is possible that the law could reflect something of this social
consensus without making the commands of Title VII wholly inflexible. Professor Ian Ayres makes the interesting suggestion that much
good could come if the antidiscrimination norm were regarded as a
default provision, as one that said that "unless otherwise stated" a
46. For a forceful statement, see Natural Law, IX ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA
150, 151 (Francis Lieber ed., 1836) (unsigned article by Joseph Story), reprinted in
JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A STUDY IN
POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY 313, 315 (1971). Justice Story wrote:
We call those rights perfect, which are determinate, and which may be asserted by force, or in civil society by the operation of law; and imperfect, those
which are indeterminate and vague, and which may not be asserted by force or
by law, but which are obligatory only on the conscience of the parties.
Id. Story included charity and affection on the list of imperfect obligations.
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given firm agrees not to discriminate on grounds of race, sex, age,
disability, or whatever. 7 But since the provision is a default provision, the firm will be allowed to contract out of that position by stating, for example, that it regards itself as entitled to hire and fire
workers under a contract at will. In his view there are few, if any,
firms that would ever want to affirm overtly their willingness to discriminate and to leave workers at their own mercy.
He may well be right about the importance that the choice of initial positions has on the final outcome, even in a world of free contract. But I doubt very much that the present mass of civil rights
laws would represent anything like the final position reached in a
world of voluntary contracts. In dealing with age, for example, I am
sure that firms would instantly restate by contract the mandatory
retirement provisions that were (expressly, I might add) included in
virtually all employment contracts. And surely most firms would be
prepared to take a lot of heat in order to avert the enormous costs of
compliance with the ADA. Even on the so-called core matters of
race and sex, I have no doubt that sharpened pencils would quickly
undo much of what the Civil Rights Act now requires. Disparate
impact tests of liability would quickly go, and standardized tests
would be introduced across the board. Class actions would be a thing
of the past. Even in cases of intentional discrimination, some firms
would insist on it: "All workers are required to participate in morning prayer meetings in accordance with .

. . ."

Finally, it is a nice

question as to whether Ayres' default provision should be set for or
against affirmative action, and, if for it, whether it would contain
some limitations on the extent to which it could be practiced.
Suppose, however, that the new default provisions are carried over
word for word from the current law. I have no doubt that many
firms would move with headlong speed to disclaim any intention of
discrimination on certain lines in certain cases - the market pressures would be too great for it to do otherwise. But even here the
default norm would be varied substantially. Complaints would be resolved internal to the firm by mediation or arbitration; damages
would be sharply limited; and proof would be required by clear and
convincing evidence. In practice, I think that many of these changes
would develop even if the legal default provision were the traditional
47. See Ian Ayres, Price and Prejudice, NEw

REPUBLIC,

July 6, 1992, at 30, 30

(reviewing FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1) [hereinafter Price and Prejudice]; Ian

Ayres, Alternative Grounds: Epstein's Discrimination Analysis in Other Market Settings, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 67, 70-71 (1994) [hereinafter Alternative Grounds].

one of contracts at will, for firms that depend on a steady stream of
labor from all parts of the workforce can be expected to take strong
steps not to be cut off from large segments of their market. Making
the Civil Rights Act into a set of reversible default provisions is fine
by me, for it unleashes the entire contractual mechanism to attack
the problem. It is Ayres' companions in the civil rights movement,
not me, who are likely to go ballistic over his proposal.
V.

EXTENSIONS OF THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE INTO
OTHER MARKETS

At the Symposium, another line- of challenge to Forbidden
Grounds attacked its ostensible reticence in dealing with levels of
discrimination in other markets. Thus, Professor Ayres in this issue
asks about the role of antidiscrimination law in three separate markets: public accommodations, housing, and automobile retailing 4849 on
which he has done some extensive and well-publicized research. It
is therefore useful to indicate how I would approach these areas in
light of my positions taken in Forbidden Grounds.
A.

Public Accommodations

During the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the rules
governing public accommodations were front and center during the
debate. The refusal of many firms in the hotel and transportation
industries to serve blacks, or to serve them on equal terms with
whites, was widely regarded as a national disgrace, and there was
virtually no principled opposition to the extension of the civil rights
acts in this area. At that time, the Act broke the dominance of these
practices by a reception that was close to unanimous, with only a few
marginal holdouts. 50 As a matter of political prudence, it is often
wise to follow the maxim that "if it ain't broke, then don't fix it,"
and for that reason alone the antidiscrimination principle simply appears beyond reproach.
Yet it turns out, as ever, that this position is one fraught with
48. Alternative Grounds, supra note 47.
49. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discriminationin Retail CarNegotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991).
50. Professor Ayres asks in his article for me to acknowledge the overstatement
found in Forbidden Grounds where I noted that the "early instances of noncompliance
all arose when individual firms, eager to obey the law, found themselves set upon by
gangs of racists determined to shut them down by brute force." FORBIDDEN GROUNDS,
supra note 1, at 127, quoted in Alternative Grounds, supra note 47, at 72. Ayres is
correct that this sentence with its "all" is an overstatement, as should be evident to anyone who has read the rest of the paragraph that referred to "the few establishments that
defied the law" and to "the mass of private firms that wanted to escape the clutch of
local restrictions and local prejudice but could not." Id. Little turns on my inadvertent
and incautious overstatement.
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hidden dangers. Once it is clear that discrimination is not to be tolerated in the area of public accommodations, then there is no principled hard-edged line of resistance to the ADA, and the enormous
dislocations that it creates in dealing with those facilities, both public and private, covered under the Act. Discrimination is forbidden
as a matter of principle, and it is only a hazy matter of cost and
reasonable accommodation, as to which forms of discrimination are
allowable, and how much. The benign statement of the principle thus
opens the door to extensions that are far more controversial in their
application and impact.
It is, however, possible in principle to ask the right questions about
public accommodation laws to see whether or not they meet the
standards set out in Forbidden Grounds. Here it follows that any use
of private violence to keep those premises segregated (or integrated)
should be met with the public force of the state. In principle, therefore, it might be possible to justify an antidiscrimination law by
showing that it operates as a cheap and effective counter to private
violence. In hostile climates firms that want to hire without discrimination may rightly fear that they will be attacked and intimidated
by others who wish it to adhere to some rigid racial policy. The use
of a strong antidiscrimination statute thus orders the firm to do what
it chooses to do in any event, and gives it a cloak of protection
against private threats that might not otherwise be so easily parried.
"I had to do it or face legal sanctions," is a way to do the right thing
without owing up to it. If only a tiny fraction of all firms wished to
remain segregated in any fashion, then this argument would carry
some weight as a somewhat overbroad tactic to minimize the scope
of private violence. Today, however, I suspect that this possible justification for government intervention carries little conviction, if it ever
did: recall that segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson5 was mandated by
state regulation that was opposed by the regulated firms.
The second potential justification for imposing the nondiscrimination principle on public accommodations is to counteract monopoly
power. Historically this justification fits in quite well with the standard accounts of the subject. In earlier times there was often one
carrier (a common carrier) and one inn for travelers on the highway,
and their monopoly position (whether de jure or de facto) was properly countered, even when race or sex was not an issue, by a nondiscrimination provision. That nondiscrimination provision in turn had
51. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

to have some flexibility to allow discrimination that was cost driven.
All travelers on the railroad or customers at the inn did not have to
pay the same price regardless of the accommodations that they received. And if certain railroad runs were more costly than others,
then the fares could vary accordingly. But no matter what, the common carrier and the inn received a quid pro quo to offset their nondiscrimination obligation. They were allowed to charge rates that
permitted them a just return on their initial investment. The purpose
of the legal rules was to offset the embarrassments of a system without free entry.
Today the situation is in most settings quite different, for virtually
no inns and few carriers have any degree of monopoly power. At this
point the theory developed in Forbidden Grounds suggests that the
older nondiscrimination restraints should be lifted. And to what
harm? Is there anyone who thinks that even one major corporation
would adopt a policy of exclusion on the grounds of race or sex? Or
if it did, that it could profit by that strategy in the marketplace? The
intuitions about the irrationality of the practice are correct precisely
because discrimination in these settings is a losing proposition for
everyone concerned. Indeed a repeal of Title 112 (governing public
accommodations) could have some symbolic benefit if large numbers
of national firms adopted (as I predict they would) vigorous voluntary antidiscrimination principles of their own. Once it is clear that
firms are taking this position on their own accord, it becomes somewhat harder to take the cynical view that these institutions are only
doing the right thing because they are required to do so by law, and
thus should receive no praise for their conduct.
The continued insistence on the nondiscrimination principle for
private facilities in competitive situations has, moreover, serious negative spillover effects. The ADA, with its onerous obligations, is one
illustration. In addition, the full range of private clubs and associations could easily be classified as public accommodations subject to
the restrictions of the various antidiscrimination laws. Yet here do
we really have a better society if everyone is forced to follow the
same minimum constraints on admission rules? Is there no place for
all women's clubs and associations, or for all black or Hispanic organizations? Should the law schools shut down their Black Law Students Association (LSA), Hispanic LSA, Asian LSA, Christian
LSA, and Jewish LSA, and prevent any other organization from
forming? And do we assume that persons who join these clubs and
associations never join any other club that has open membership? Do
we assume that there is no collaboration among groups?
52.

Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6

(West 1981 & Supp. 1994).
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In all these cases the principle of freedom of association matters
for us all. Because it does matter, we ought to move with great caution before arguing for its abrogation in a broad class of cases.
Whether or not I approve of the ends or means of some private organization should influence my decision to join, assuming that the
organization sees fit to have me. And it may influence my decision
whether to attend functions that they sponsor or host when not otherwise for membership. Other people face identical choices. If the
tide of sentiment turns against these private associations, it will be
duly registered in the decline in their numbers and influence. There
is no reason to use coercive legislation to hasten a process that will
assume far greater legitimacy if left to advance of its own accord.
B.

Housing

Professor Ayres also claims that my position should logically lead
me to support racially restrictive covenants of the sort that were first
declared unenforceable in Shelley v. Kraemer5 3 on constitutional
grounds. While there is an extensive learned debate as to whether
the judicial enforcement of these covenants constitutes "state action"
that triggers investigation under the Fourteenth Amendment, there
is little disagreement today that such covenants should be banned by
legislation, even if not reached by the Constitution. And they are.
Given my position on employment discrimination laws, it should
come as no surprise that I take exception to the conventional positions, both as regards the constitutional interpretation of the equal
protection clause and the political question of the reach of fair housing laws. Initially, the state enforcement of private covenants should
not be regarded as a situation where the state "denies" any person
the equal protection of the laws. On this point I differ from Dean
Allen, who would deny state enforcement for all racially restrictive
covenants, even though elsewhere, including employment relations,
the state should stay its hand.5 4 As I read him, he would not require
any person to hire any other for a job, nor would he refrain from
enforcing ordinary employment contracts as written because some
white workers received more favorable terms than black workers or
the reverse: there is no explicit racial content to the promises made
53.

Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1949) (denying injunctive relief). The compan-

ion case is Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), which refused to allow covenantees
damage actions for breach.
54. W.B. Allen, Epstein's Challenge to the Civil Rights Regime, 31 SAN DIEGO L.

REv. 57, 63-64 (1994).

or to the contracts not made. And Allen certainly would not impose
any of the now-fashionable restrictions on job testing in the workplace. But he claims that my position requires more than simple repeal of a statute. "His [Epstein's] proposal for a repeal of Title VII,
accordingly, is actually a proposal to establish secure public protection for discriminatory contracts. It is not, then, the putatively negative proposition ('repeal the Civil Rights Act') but the daringly
positive, proactive proposition, that society should give discrimination the force of law, that deserves closest attention."'5
While his argument has a certain appeal, I think that it is a mistake to withdraw protection from this class of contracts, and to treat
them differently from other private engagements which receive judicial protection. So long as all persons are entitled to enforce
whatever covenants they choose to make, then the decision to exclude is theirs, and not the state's. The privilege, moreover, is universal, and there are surely many groups from the Congressional Black
Caucus on down that have explicit requirements of race for membership. If we respect Allen's concern with explicit racial clauses, what
about the Binai B'rith and the National Organization of Women?
Under Allen's theory these groups could exclude whom they please
without much difficulty because they are not seeking legal assistance
to achieve their ends. But suppose a group member wanted to give
certain confidential information to white outsiders in violation of internal rules; or suppose the state were asked to give an action in
trespass against whites who sought to attend meetings from which
they were excluded on grounds of race. In my view the state should
award damages and grant injunctions in these cases just as it would
in any other. It would of course be a scandal to enforce only some of
these exclusive arrangements while denying legal protection to
others. But Allen's argument is not directed toward selective contractual enforcement, but any contractual enforcement, and I assume that he would refuse to punish those contractual
breaches in a
6
color blind fashion, to blacks and whites alike.
The diffusion of responsibility for the creation of these covenants,
moreover, has important implications for the constitutional issues
which, on matters such as these, closely track the policy debate. On
this issue, too, the private initiation of the covenants is critical to
understanding the overall legal position. Most concretely, the state
does not deny any person equal protection of the law when it enforces equally the contracts made by all. To substitute the looser
expression "state action" for the narrower term "deny" distorts the
55.
56.

Id. at 62.
For an elaboration, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Of Maginot Lines and

Constitutional Compromises, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

173 (Ellen F. Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1990).
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focus of the equal protection clause, expands its scope vastly, and
effectively obscures the critical question: who has denied a given person entrance to a certain parcel of land? In all cases, the court takes
its marching orders from the landowners who have made the covenants. Restrictive covenants are property interests like any other,
and their enforcement is in my view constitutionally compelled, on
an even-handed basis, unless one of the traditional justifications for
the nonenforcement of promises is available.
Is it? Once again it is difficult to make any categorical judgment
about the matter. Private violence is one means of keeping certain
people out of certain neighborhoods. Where that is found, only one
public response is acceptable: the state must vigorously protect all
citizens who wish to gain access to the private property that they
have purchased, or to which they have been invited - period. The
public roads are a common over which all can pass on even terms,
and any effort to deny any person his right of passage should be
understood as a mortal threat to the social contract and treated accordingly. But restrictive covenants are not generally found in that
context. The more likely ground of dispute, therefore, is whether a
set of restrictive covenants covers a large enough segment of the relevant market that its use represents some form of monopoly power,
properly attacked on traditional antitrust grounds. In this context,
the possibility of successful attack will be much improved if the restrictive covenants are fortified on the outside by a set of zoning restrictions that prevent other developers from entering the market in
nearby locations.
These scenarios hardly exhaust the universe of possibilities, however, and where none of these conditions is satisfied, then these covenants should be enforced like any other, by a state judiciary that is
unconcerned with their content and their symbolic effect. And the
housing markets will, I think, be the better for it for three reasons.
First, there are some important gains in allowing those persons who
wish to live by themselves to do so. If there are religious communes,
or persons with strong environmental or recreational interests, why
should they be forced to congregate with the rest of us when they
want to go their separate way? And what of black separatist groups
that wish to be free of white influences? Here again it becomes dangerous to attempt to make any public distinction between allowable
and nonallowable forms of discrimination. It is just best to let all
groups decide what they please. Once they are allowed to do so, then
the governance task in other segments of the market will be easier

because the variation of tastes of the remaining individuals will be
smaller than would otherwise be the case. If persons with strong racial biases, of whatever sentiment, move into separate communities
of their own, then governance in mainstream communities
will be
5
easier to maintain, just as it is in employment settings. 7
Second, the prohibition against racial restrictive covenants places
strong limitations on the ability of private developers to promote desired racial and social integration. Once the decision in Shelley'8 was
handed down, the question arose whether private parties could enter
into "benevolent" or "well-motivated" race-conscious covenants. A
group that wishes to integrate a large housing project is always
aware of the problem of the "tipping point." As Professor Robert
Cooter demonstrates anew in his Article, typical organizations house
individuals who have widely different preferences for the racial
mix.59 If there are one hundred units, it may be that one white person will remain only if there is no black person in the unit. If one is
admitted, he will then move out. His departure, however, will unnerve another white person who is almost as unsettled by the prospect as the first. His departure in turn could trigger the departure of
a third, and so on down the line until all leave. The situation is a
tragedy because before the unraveling it could well be the case that
a substantial number of white residents are quite happy to reside in
a building that is, say, fifty percent black, but not more. A system of
racial restrictive covenants that requires that the population of black
residents be kept at between thirty and fifty percent (or whites at
between fifty and seventy percent) could well stabilize the situation
and prevent the flight from taking place. If the court were agnostic
about the content of restrictive covenants, then these would be enforced without hesitation. But once Shelley is the dominant precedent, then courts must decide whether all covenants with explicit
racial content fall, or whether only those with invidious motives fall.
And most courts have concluded the latter.60
Any per se decision in favor of invalidation is quite costly. Either
many individuals are forced to endure segregated housing projects
that most people don't quite want, or it becomes necessary to use
very costly and inefficient proxies to maintain the appropriate racial
balance. In practice this strategy is far from foolproof, but one possible, if costly, strategy is for landlords to keep certain types of units
57. See FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 61-67.
58. Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1949).
59. See Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 133,
141-44 (1994). He illustrates the judicial efforts that thwarted the use of racial restrictive covenants in Starrett City. United States v. Starrett City Assoc., 840 F.2d 1096 (2d
Cir. 1988).
60. See Progress Dev. Co. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961).
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off the market until others are rented in ways that establish the stable racial mixture of the structure. In practice, this usually means
that the expensive units are rented first to more well-to-do white
families before others are able to move in. The consequent loss of
occupancy and the disingenuous behavior of rental agents surely
count as costs of the entire exercise. And for whose benefit?
Third, the easy precedent for intervention on these grounds is capable of mischievous expansion to other areas that do not have the
same controversial overtones as race. One illustration is housing
projects for senior citizens. The requirement that these units take
children unless all members are over sixty-five has the unfortunate
consequence of shutting senior citizens into tighter ghettoes than
would otherwise be required for their personal security.6 As with
public accommodations, academics are often too confident that they
can identify a core to the antidiscrimination principle, when in practice they cannot. On this matter it is hardly wise for them to try.
The usual argument for freedom of contract (and association), subject to the standard constraints of force, fraud and monopoly, should
carry the day.
C. Retail Car Sales

The last market Professor Ayres looks at is automobile retailing.
Here he refers extensively to his own studies of the automobile resale
market which reported that blacks and women on average paid
larger mark-ups for new automobiles than did white men.62 The
study in question was not based on observed market data, but on
comparisons between the offers that matched testers received from
these dealers. In one sense, the study seems to be of little assistance
to his own thesis. There was no evidence of systematic animus-based
discrimination against blacks or females, and some evidence that
these byers got their best offers from white male salesman. Even if
the difference in outcomes does persist along racial or sexual lines, it
is not clear what follows: it could be, empirically, that Ayres has
only shown, without explaining how or why, that blacks and women
are not as good bargainers as white men.
For Ayres that significance lies in the evidence that his data furnishes to undermine the proposition that in competitive markets all
61. See FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 63-65.
62. Alternative Grounds, supra note 47, at 76-84.

buyers should be expected to pay about the same price.63 During the
course of the Conference, many of us asked whether his results could
be replicated in a closer study of actual market transactions. At that
time no empirical study of that sort had been done, but more recently a very systematic study of the issue has been prepared by
Penny Koujianou Goldberg which is in evident tension with Ayres'
broader empirical claims. 4 Goldberg was impressed by the care that
Ayres used in instructing his testers, and in my estimation underestimated the importance of using independent testers who do not know
the purpose of the test and who do not share in the ideological
presuppositions of its principal investigator. But she was nonetheless
troubled by the fact that only 20 percent of his negotiations resulted
in completed transactions.6 5 In fact, in his sample there were apparent contracts (i.e., a verbal agreement on the price that was not
binding) in only 25 percent of the cases with white males, and in 15
percent of the cases with the remainder of his sample. The market
would be in a state of perpetual turmoil if huge percentages of potential buyers were unable to buy cars at all. A technique of testing
that leaves so many incomplete transactions cannot be an accurate
replica of a functioning market.
Goldberg was conscious of this difficulty and therefore ignored all
aborted negotiations to look at data dereived solely from completed
sales in actual markets. She used as her guide the Consumer Expenditure Survey which "includes an extensive set of household characteristics as well as details about the stock of owned vehicles,
purchase of new and disposal of old cars, trade-in, financial etc. that
allow me to control for buyers' different backgrounds, financial ability and previous experience in bargaining for a new car. As measure
of price discrimination I use the absolute and relative difference between the transactions prices reported in the consumer expenditure
survey and the suggested retail prices quoted in the Automotive
News Market Data Book." 66
At this point it is best to state Goldberg's conclusion in her own
words:
The results are strikingly different from the ones reported in Ayres. All
variables referring to race and sex are statistically insignificant and often
have signs opposite to the ones reported in Ayres. The natural question is
then, "how are these finding consistent with Ayres' results?" This paper

63. Id. at 84.
64. Penny Koujianou Goldberg, Dealer Price Discrimination in New Car
Purchases: Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (working paper, April
1994, mss. in possession of author).
65. Id. at 1.
66. Id. at 2.
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shows that the lack of evidence in favor of race or gender price discrimination found in the micro data can be reconciled with Ayres' findings."7

At this point, Goldberg then makes a critical distinction in the
distribution of reservation prices for white males on the one hand
and for minorities (including women) on the other. Both groups have
the same median price figures, which is captured in her finding that
there is no price discrimination. But while the means of the two
populations are essentially identical, the variations about those
means are not. For reasons that she cannot fully explain, it appears
that minorities have a wider dispersion around the mean than do
white males. 68 Once dealers know (or intuit) that difference then
they should adopt different negotiation strategies for the two groups:
they should start (as did Ayres' testers) with high prices to all minority customers, in the hopes of picking up that portion of the distribution with high reservation prices, and then settle for less than
the mean with respect to others that have lower prices. That strategy
carries with it some costs, which are not worth incurring for the
white male population whose distribution is more closely concentrated around the mean. The possibility then arises that the dealers
got their signals crossed because they faced a set of minority testers
who did not bargain the way in which their experience told them
that real minority buyers bargain. The dealers did not pick up the
new signals and kept to the old strategies, which could explain why
there were so few completed transactions and a higher median price
for minority testers.
Goldberg's results show how difficult it is to control for unanticipated biases in dealing with testing markets, but even she does not
seek to examine buyers' bargaining strategies in automotive markets.
As these were the focus of the Ayres experiments, they are worth a
bit more attention here. Initially, only, if some residual element of
monopoly power remains, is it sensible for buyers to resort to the
extraordinary tactics deployed to purchase a car. Rarely in practice
will the determined buyer, regardless of race or sex, simply negotiate
on price. The bidding strategies used in Ayres' tests therefore constitute only a tiny subgroup of the full range of market techniques. It
is, for example, commonplace for buyers to undertake elaborate efforts to arrange auctions and to otherwise play dealers off against
each other; or to indulge in Oscar-like episodes of play acting and
bluffing, as people bring their tool kits and their mock mechanic
67.
68.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 2-3, 29-33.

friends into the dealer's showrooms in order to influence the price. If
only a small fraction of buyers adopt strategies that turn only on
price, then any inferences drawn from his data are correspondingly
compromised.
Nor does Ayres take into account the complexities on the selling
side of the market. There is no reason to assume that the selling
patterns of dealers remain constant across the model year. Will dealers behave the same when there is a hot new model on the floor, as
they will when they are trying to close out old models? How does
advertising influence the behavior of both buyers and sellers? And,
most importantly, how does the compensation system for sales representatives influence their behavior? And how effectively will any system of government intervention be to stop the perceived abuse
without imposing heavy costs on the industry as a whole?
On this last point, the evidence is clouded. There is, to be sure,
some evidence that dealers are moving (without regulation) to "no
dicker stickers" in the window,6 9 which surely eliminate any possibility of discrimination. But the practice is far from uniform today, and
there is at least some reason to believe that Ayres' preferred
method7 0 - requiring disclosure of dealer's cost and then requiring
a fixed markup of inventory - could wreak havoc with the conventional mode of sale in the retail car market.1 1 The value of a car on
the dealer's floor is not simply measured by its price. Inventory can
fluctuate with demand and supply after the car is obtained. Disclosure of that information would provide only limited value to the customer but could not prevent* some negotiation between the parties
thereafter. The dealer will still insist on a substantial price if the
demand is high and may well be willing to let cars go at or below
cost if the demand is low. In addition, the dealer has to face the
question of motivating sales representatives to move the car. Normally this is done by selling the car twice, first informally to the
sales representative, and then afterwards to the customer. The sales
representative's compensation is the difference between the two numbers. It is not easy to figure out how to motivate sales personnel to
sell cars if their compensation is not tied to their performance. The
two-tier system of pricing in effect gives the sales representative a
100 percent commission over a fixed cost to him. It may, of course,
be worth while to incur these costs if the new program could reduce
some of the anxiety in new car buying, but that is a business decision
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that should be driven by business concerns. 2 It is not a legal decision driven by fears of racial discrimination. Is it worth trying to
force the creation of new systems of selling in order to obviate a
problem which if Goldberg's conclusion is correct, is an artifact of
Ayres' system of data collection?
VI.

HISTORICAL EVIDENCE

The battle over the antidiscrimination norms extends to the historical evidence. One of the contentions in Forbidden Grounds that has
set off the most spirited debate is that the preservation of invidious
forms of discrimination in the Old South is best explained by the
failure to meet the preconditions for a regime of free contract.
Throughout the South there was heavy state regulation of private
conduct on grounds of race; and there were extensive levels of private violence, often aided or condoned by public officials. Taken in
their entirety, my claim is that this system of pervasive state control
and private violence made free entry by rival firms impossible in
Southern labor markets before the effective abolition of Jim Crow by
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Before reviewing the present controversy it is important to indicate
why the matter is regarded as so important for the debate. If the
thesis that I have advanced is correct, then the alternative thesis
must be wrong: that thesis says that the strong set of cultural norms
that supported discrimination against black persons was self-sustaining even in the absence of public and private force. If that proposition is correct, then it becomes far easier for proponents of Title
VII to contest the claim that the mechanism of competition can deliver desirable social outcomes. If workers of equal skill and ability
will not be able to attract equal wages for equal work, then state
regulation may be an important tool for making markets more responsive to economic needs even after the passing of Jim Crow. But
if the use of cultural and social pressures alone are not sufficient to
account for the outcomes under a Jim Crow regime, then a very different interpretation of the historical evidence is warranted. Now,
the initial burst of advance for black labor after 1964, especially in
the South but also in the North, is better explained by the pro-market operation of the Civil Rights Act, which in its early days brought
down the coercive mechanisms, public and private, that prevented
72. James Bennet, Buying Without HagglingAs Cars Get Fixed Prices, THE NEW
YORK TIMEs, February 1, 1994, § A, at 1.

the formation of a free market.
So how, then, does the evidence stack up? Here one point concerns
the formal content of the labor law in the Old South. An examination of the statute books of the Jim Crow states reveals only one
explicit segregation law that is directed to employment markets, the
1915 South Carolina statute that instituted the regime of separate
but equal in textile plants.73 One inference that might be drawn is
that the absence of any explicit, race-based prohibitions on employment meant that no legal force was directed toward the employment
relation. That was the initial conclusion reached by Professor Ayres
in his acerbic review of Forbidden Grounds that appeared in The
New Republic.74 And it has been stressed by other commentators as
well.75
Nonetheless, I still believe that the opposite case is far stronger.
The initial point is that these revisionist accounts of the Jim Crow
are at sharp variance with the usual accounts of the period. Here it
is, I think, sufficient to quote from just one capsule summary about
Jim Crow written long before Forbidden Grounds was published.
Professor Kenneth Karst is not known as an unstinting friend of free
markets, and he is a strong supporter of the modern civil rights establishment. Yet his account starkly contradicts the assertion that
public coercion and private violence were not needed to maintain
segregated workforces in the South. He writes:
Jim Crow illustrates the main technique of nativist domination: the en-

forced separation of members of the subordinate cultural group from a wide
range of public and private institutions that, in the aggregate, constitutes
"society." Racial segregation in the American South was the successor to
slavery and the Black Codes, both of which had been decisively made unlawful by congressional legislation and the Civil War amendments. In this

historical context it is easy to see Jim Crow for what it was: a thoroughgoing program designed to maintain blacks as a group in the position of a
subordinate racial case by means of a systematic denial of belonging. Jim

Crow law extended from disenfranchisement to prohibitions on interracial

marriage and imposed racial segregation everywhere: schools, courtrooms,
buses, restaurants - indeed, all places where people of both races otherwise

might interact in public. Private racial discrimination also played an important role in maintaining the caste system, producing segregation in housing,
employment, and public accommodations, and leaving a legacy that, even
73. S.C. Crim. Code § 45 (1922).
74. Price and Prejudice, supra note 47, at 31.
75. See, e.g., Verkerke, supra note 44, at 2091. Professor Verkerke writes:
With the exception of the South Carolina textile employment segregation law,
all of the statutes to which Epstein refers involved areas of economic and social
life other than labor markets . . . . Contrary to Epstein's hypothesis, the absence of discriminatory statutes mandating employment segregation suggests
strongly that there was no hole to be patched in that area. In the labor market,
at least, other forces sufficiently enforced the segregationist norm.
Id. (footnote omitted). For a similar account, see John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus
Analysis in Assessing Employment DiscriminationLaw, 44 STAN. L REV. 1583, 1590
(1992) (reviewing FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1).
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today, remains only partially remedied. Lynching was the system's ultimate
weapon, and it was by no means a wholly private enterprise.7 6

Karst gives his due the place that private discrimination has in the
scheme, but the strong emphasis in the quoted passage is on the constant and pervasive system of domination and coercion which is
backed in the end by the use of violence. In light of this description,
it is worth bringing a public choice perspective to the interconnections between the public and private acts. As Karst points out, the
Jim Crow South featured regulation in a large number of important
markets: marriage, education, and transportation for starters. Karst
also makes due note of the Jim Crow laws that systematically excluded blacks from voting in any elections (including the critical
state and local elections), and that the formal power structure from
sheriffs to judges was entirely dominated by white persons who supported the segregated structure. The obvious question to ask is, why
assume that these Southerners were content to allow a regime of
laissez-faire to dominate in employment markets when they were so
insistent on imposing racial caste distinctions in all other areas of
Southern life? I know of no theory of human motivation or of public
choice that would start with the assumption that the key actors all
had a split personality. If coercion was necessary to maintain white
control over the labor markets, then we should expect to find it, at
least if we know where to look.
The question, therefore, is to see whether it is possible to identify
other mechanisms that might be available to segregate and to control
Southern labor markets. Here the first thing to do is to look for various statutes and rules neutral on their face which could be impressed
into the service of propping up Jim Crow. Some powerful evidence is
gathered on this question in David Bernstein's contribution to this
symposium." Bernstein details the connection between the systems
of public education (rigidly controlled under Jim Crow) and the entrance requirements set by unions for membership and by state
boards under their licensing authority. He notes what should be regarded as commonplace: the license boards often did not serve to
protect with unflinching loyalty the interest of the public at large,
but responded to union pressures which "used the licensing statutes
to prevent blacks from gaining licenses in professions in which they
76.
Identity,
77.
ernment

(1994).

See Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural

64 N.C. L.

REV.

303, 320-321 (1986).

David E. Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A HistoricalExample of the Use of GovRegulatory Power Against African-Americans, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 89

were once numerous - particularly, though far from exclusively, in
- and to prevent blacks from getting a toehold in other
the South
1
fields." 7
Bernstein also notes that the use of neutral laws for partisan purposes is an old theme in constitutional law. As long ago as Yick Wo
v. Hopkins"9 the Supreme Court was confronted with the economic
perils that licensing statutes posed. In that case, the Court struck
down on equal protection grounds a licensing statute whose requirements were ostensibly aimed at preventing fires but were used to
close down Chinese laundries that operated in wooden buildings
while non-Chinese laundries in wooden buildings were allowed to operate. The key feature was the differential enforcement of the law,
which itself was neutral on its face. But that decision, while important, did not have the effect of striking down all licensing laws whatsoever, for the Supreme Court shortly after Yick Wo, allowed
licensing statutes for physicians, 0 and during the misnamed Lochner81 era routinely sustained a wide range of licensing statutes.
The risk of differential enforcement posed by Yick Wo is endemic
to the area of licensing. It should be perfectly obvious that same
strategy could have been used in the South during the height of Jim
Crow, and Bernstein details with a numbing thoroughness the effect
of the licensing laws on physicians, plumbers, and barbers.
As applied to physicians, the licensing laws induced a sharp decline in the numbers of blacks able to enter the profession.82 Thus
the number of black physicians in the South, which had been rising
before 1910, leveled off and eventually declined as the black medical
schools were shut down by the American Medical Association. 3 The
evidence on increases and declines in the percentage of blacks in the
labor force is strong evidence that the social pressures of Jim Crow
did not have the economic clout that has been so uniformly attributed to them by my numerous critics. After all, if these were successful, then what explains the initial black increase in market share,
given that the attitudes did not shift markedly over the relevant periods? Social pressures did not shut down black institutions; government officials did when they closed five of the seven black medical
schools. 84 And when they did so they choked off the supply in a way
that no set of social sanctions could possibly hope to achieve.
78. Id. at 90 (citations omitted).
79. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
80. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
81. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
82. Bernstein, supra note 77, at 93-94.
83. Id. at 93 (citing Reuben A. Kessel, The A.M.A. and the Supply of Physicians,
35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 267, 270 (1970)).
84. Id.
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The situation in the plumbing trade was little different. As with
physicians, there is surely some public health justification for the
regulation of plumbers, given the risks of infection spread through
the water supply. But once again, a system of regulation introduced
for good motives can easily be turned to bad. Almost like clockwork,
the dominant "Plumbers' and Steamfitters' Union, affiliated with the
American Federation of Labor (AFL), excluded blacks nationally
through the Lochner era."8 5 And once again, the upshot was, after
1910, a decline in black labor in the markets8" - a result that cannot be squared with the fashionable view that social norms are sufficient to keep blacks out of certain key industries and trades. As late
as the 1950s there7 was only very spotty black representation in the
8
plumbing trades.
A similar pattern was found in the barbering trades, where once
again the licensing laws were used (although with somewhat less
success) to keep blacks out of the trade, or at least significant portions of it.8 8 The Southern supporters of Jim Crow had little need to
regulate the terms of the employment relation if licensing laws can
keep people out of the trade altogether. But by the same token, the
white interest groups behind the passage of these statutes did not use
their resources idly. They worked to achieve passage of the statute
because they feared the competition from rival groups, notwithstanding the dominant social norms in their favor.
There are also many other statutes that reflect the restrictive impact of government action. In this regard, Professor Ayres 89 has graciously brought to my attention an article by Professor William
85. Id. at 94 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 96 (describing the Ohio experience) (citing DAVID A. GERBER, BLACK
OHIO AND THE COLOR LINE, 1860-1915, at 303 (1976)); id. at 97 (describing Philadelphia and Chicago) (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 98 (two licensed black plumbers in Maryland, out of 3,200; first black
plumber in Colorado licensed in 1950; one licensed black plumber in Charlotte as of
1968) (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 99-103.
89. It is perhaps worthwhile noting a bit of history. Ayres published his highly
critical review of Forbidden Grounds, Price and Prejudice, supra note 47. On June 28,
1992, he sent to me a brief letter with Cohen's article which noted simply: "I may be
wrong in asserting that Jim Crow largely ignored the employment relation." Letter from
Ian Ayres to Richard A. Epstein (June 28, 1992) (on file with author). He subsequently
wrote a letter to The New Republic noting the historical oversimplification, but maintaining the position taken in his review that social forces could have had a devastating
effect on black success in the South: "Even in the South, boycotts by bigoted employers
and consumers could massively restrict the profitability of integrated or all-black production." Letter from Ian Ayres to Leon Wieseltier, Literary Editor, The New Republic
(Sept. 12, 1992) (copy on file with author). Ayres himself has graciously allowed the

Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865-1940: A
PreliminaryAnalysis.9" Initially, Professor Cohen's title reference to
involuntary servitude hardly resonates with the claim that Southern
labor markets were laissez-faire inventions. Professor Cohen therefore identifies other forms of general labor relations, such as enticement statutes, which made it a criminal offense to entice a worker
"'by offering higher wages in any other way whatsoever.' ,, According to Professor Cohen these statutes had been once used in
early England, had then been largely repealed, and had been reintroduced into the South between 1865 and 1867, where they operated
as "the most common measures aimed at controlling the Negro labor
force adopted in these years. 92 These statutes remained in active
use until World War II, when presumably their effects were
swamped by the large migration to the North. 93 What is instructive
about these statutes is that they are designed to prevent the departure of black labor from the South. If the sole goal of the
Southerners had been simply not to associate with blacks, then the
statutes would be largely perverse in their end: whites should be
thrilled that others are prepared to pay for the one-way train tickets
for blacks out of the South. But once the goal was to keep blacks in
the South as a ready source of labor, then the picture becomes more
ominous. Should we believe that the desire was to ensure that these
workers received a competitive wage? Or, were other motives at
work?
Once again Professor Cohen's research reveals other mechanisms.
The Emigrant-Agent Laws imposed heavy taxes on those agents who
sought to encourage black labor to leave the South for more gainful
correspondence to be made public.
90. William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865-1940: A Preliminary Analysis, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES 317 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., enlarged ed,
1988) [hereinafter Involuntary Servitude]. Cohen's article originally appeared in 42 J,
oF S. HIsT. 31 (1976).
91. Involuntary Servitude, supra note 90, at 319. The quoted language is the text
of the Georgia statute. According to Cohen all states except Virginia made enticement a
criminal statute. Id.
92. Id. at 319-20.
93. There is evidence, however, that the migration did take place notwithstanding
these statutes, for the Davis-Bacon Act was passed in 1931 in part to make it more
difficult for itinerant black crews from the South to compete with local white Northern
labor. See, e.g., David Bernstein, The Supreme Court and "Civil Rights," 1886-1908,
100 YALE L.J. 725 (1990) [hereinafter Civil Rights]; see also Employment of Labor on
Federal Construction Work: Hearings on H.R. 7995 and H.R. 9232 Before the House
Comm. on Labor, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1930) ("A contractor from a Southern State
secured a contract to build a Government marine hospital, as I remember it, on Long
Island; that he brought with him an entire outfit of Negro laborers from the South
.... ") (letter of Ethelbert Stewart, Commissioner of Labor Statistics for Secretary of
Labor James J. Davis) quoted in DAVID BERNSTEIN, THE DAVIS-BACON ACT: LET'S
BRING JIM CROW TO AN END 11 n.7 (Cato Institute 1993).
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employment elsewhere. 4 If there were no market pressures operating for the exit, then presumably these statutes would have been unnecessary. As it was, they were unable to stem the flow of migrant
labor from the South, but not for want of trying. Vagrancy laws
were used as a means for forcing blacks to enter into labor contracts
in the first place, by attacking so-called idleness, 9 5 and contract-enforcement laws in Mississippi "required Negroes to enter into labor
contracts by a specific day each January," 96 and laws in other Southern states required employers to grant discharge to their
black labor97
ers before they could be hired by other employers.
This set of laws (like licensing laws) hardly looks as though it was
fashioned to promote open and competitive markets in the South.
But the question is whether this group of laws together could account for the rigid patterns of segregation that were reported, for
example, by Professor James Heckman and Brook Payner, in the
South Carolina textile mills during the years between 1900 and
1964.98 Here the most notable feature of the South Carolina experience was the constant, but low, percentage of black men and women
at work in the textile industry. The percentage of black men during
the period hovers around the five percent mark, while that of black
women is still lower at below one percent. 99 The numbers remain
remarkably constant over a period that includes two world wars, a
boom, a depression, the desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of
0
Education,"'
and the countless other events large and small over
that sixty-five year period. It is hard to believe that any unregulated
market would show such constant proportions over so long a period
of time, and then suddenly shift with a massive intervention of external - that is, federal - origin the moment that the civil rights laws
were passed.
To be sure, one could argue that social pressures might account
for the rigid separation of black and white workers during this time.
But if free entry in any form were allowed, then at least one should
expect to see an increase in the percentage of black workers engaged
94. Involuntary Servitude, supra note 90, at 320-22.
95. Id. at 324.
96. Id. at 322.

97. Id.
98. James J. Heckman & Brook S. Payner, Determining the Impact of Federal
AntidiscriminationPolicy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina, 79 AM. EcON. REV. 138 (1989).
99. Id. at 142 (graph).

100. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

in the textile industry, for these could have been'hired by new firms
with all black work forces without running afoul of any law. And in
equilibrium there should be some tendency for black wages to equal
white ones, given the equal productivity of the two classes of workers. Yet the percentage of black workers in the market remained
constant, which is odd if free entry had indeed been possible; recall
white resistance to working with black workers is no obstacle to the
creation of separate plants.
So was entry free? Here there is, so to speak, entry and entry. One
possible view of the subject is to assume that Southerners who sensed
the opportunity to hire black labor might have set up plants that
specialized in their employment. But it is said that social pressures
could be too strong for isolated individuals, as if they had to worry
only about ostracism and not about violence. But what about
Northerners who might come down to the South to set up these
plants? Clearly a single Northerner would find it difficult to buck the
local prejudices. But if the gains were large enough, the entry could
be orchestrated so that extensive capital could support the entry of
large groups or entire communities dedicated to hiring available
black labor. Yet the plants that closed down in the North and moved
to the South may have been integrated after a fashion in the North,
only to be totally segregated in the South. Surely something was going on there. But what?
The key to understanding the nature of the problem rests on the
point that outsiders could not just enter the textile markets. They
also had to physically enter entire communities, and forge a wide
range of other connections both economic and social. Again, ostracism is surely one technique that is available, and one that does not
amount to the use of force or fraud within the libertarian framework. It might amount to a collective refusal to deal of the sort that
attracts the attention of the antitrust laws, but even here the
noneconomic and diffuse operation of the sanctions in all likelihood
would escape any legal response detection: no federal interest could
have been perceived, and it is hard to believe that any Southern
court would turn some local version of the antitrust laws against its
own cultural norms.
But ostracism is a strategy with limits. It certainly cannot defeat
mass migration by self-contained groups from outside the community. For the textile industry at least, which sells, not at retail, but to
the trade, customer resistance to dealing with black workers is not
really an issue. But other mechanisms could have that effect. One
possibility is that other actions could well defeat the operation of a
new textile mill in the Old South. 1' 1 Zoning laws, water lines, sewer
101.

See

FORBIDDEN GROUNDS,

supra note 1, at 251.
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hook-ups and plant inspections are all standard forms of health and
safety regulation. They could be used in a deliberate manner to frustrate the operation of Southern mills that wished to defy the implicit
but powerful local norm. And the moment that integration takes
place, the water and power could be cut off.
I am not a social historian and hence cannot document whether
these tactics were used, or how often. But reprehensible as they are,
they surely have many attractive features for the supporters of Jim
Crow. They are covert, which means that they do not generate the
same amount of bad publicity associated as the publication of rigid
segregation laws. Their administrative enforcement is far cheaper
than adjudication to the achievement of the stated end. (Even today,
under the ADA, the statutory requirements are largely enforced
through the permit system; and affirmative action requirements are
enforced through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
or accreditation review.) Of course, it might be that Southern judges
and administrative officials would not countenance these practices on
the ground that they were in violation of explicit rules and practices.
But even if legal formalism offered a sound normative theory of statutory construction, it is a very poor guide to a social history dominated by a desire to escape the limits of formal general rules. If
everyone in control of the system was in cahoots, the dominant social
mores would have received extensive amounts of coercive state
support.
My argument thus far is designed to show that social norms could
not possibly have the effect on black employment levels ascribed to
them by my critics. There remains, however, one theoretical point
that should be addressed. Both Evan Tsen Lee and Richard McAdams have noted an apparent inconsistency between what I see as the
limited power of social norms under Jim Crow and their general effectiveness elsewhere. Anyone who has read my writings on employment contracts knows that one reason I defend the contract at will in
labor markets is that I believe that informal and reputational sanctions go a long way to prevent abuse by either employers or employees.' 02 Thus, Lee asks why I find "informal private agreements to be
such a strong force [in ordinary employment contracts], yet such a
weak force when employers form cartels to exclude certain races
from certain areas of endeavor?"'' 0
102. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L.
947 (1984); see FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 147-58.
103. Lee, supra note 25, at 208.
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It is a fair question to which it is possible to offer a fair reply.
First, both employer and employee can monitor each other's behavior at reasonably low cost. In contrast, the cost of monitoring what
fellow cartel members do on the side is very expensive since they
conduct their own sales efforts outside each other's presence. Second,
within the firm, both sides have an interest in the perpetuation of the
agreement, given the positive costs of finding a new job for the employee or hiring a new worker for the employer. In the cartel, however, there are strong incentives to cheat, for cheating allows each
member to garner a larger fraction of the business while earning
more than the competitive rate of return. Customers who are aware
of the instability of cartels will actively play one member off against
another. And the fear that new entrants will come into the market
further induces cheating in the short run while the allure of monopoly profits is still high. The nonenforcement of contracts, without
more, usually leads to the breakup of these cartels. In contrast, there
are no third-party pressures that destabilize ordinary employment
relations, for, if anything, customers want to do business with firms
that have good employment relationships in order to lower their own
costs of doing business. The empirical evidence is in accord with the
basic theory; for while contracts at will in employment often prove
stable over years, cartels quickly disintegrate without legal backing. 0 The traditionalbcommon law policy, which stressed the nonenforcement of specific cartel agreements, was sound, and so too was
its willingness to respect the ordinary contract at will.
Richard McAdams takes up the same cry, attacking both my use
of the study of Japanese automobile litigation by J. Mark Ramseyer
and Minoru Nakazato, 10 5 and invoking the work of Robert Ellickson
on the role of informal norms in settling disputes among neighbors. 10 6 (For the record, I should note that I edited both the Ramseyer & Nakazato article, and the Ellickson article for the Journal
of Legal Studies.) In his view the Ramseyer & Nakazato article is
largely irrelevant to the inquiry because it deals with traffic accidents, and concerns a culture far removed from our own. The
passages in the article to which I cited, however, were contained in a
104. As Richard Posner explains: "It might seem that nonenforcement [of cartel
agreements] would be a patently inadequate remedy since even without legal sanctions
for breach of contract people would ordinarily be led by considerations of reciprocal advantage to adhere to their contracts. But a price-fixing agreement is less stable than most
contracts." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 285 (4th ed. 1992) (citations omitted). Posner draws the same opposition here that I do in the text.
105. J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement
Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (1989).
106. Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of
Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1987); Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle:
Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986)
[hereinafter Of Coase and Cattle].
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general section entitled The Fragility of Communal Norms 0 7 and
their analysis (complete with references to Lake Wobegon) was not
confined to Japanese society, but rather covered the situation where
marginal people "in most societies" could effectively play the endgame, namely, engage in litigation for their own ends. 08 To be sure,
the willingness to play this endgame increases when there are no
ongoing social relations between parties, which is often the case in
traffic litigation, and Ramseyer and Nakazato are careful to note
that strategies may differ where there are ongoing relationships between parties where reputation is a constraint and wealth is only an
imperfect proxy for utility.109 In both cases their general discussion
that
is explicitly and overtly cross-cultural, and an attack on the idea
110
in Japanese study "culture" should be understood as "king."
Their model is in perfect correspondence with the position taken in
Forbidden Grounds. There is no question that to the extent that outsiders moved to the South in order to take advantage of the existing
cultural and social structure, they would have been subject to the
dominant social pressures and would have to learn, if only for survival, to play by those rules. The ease of monitoring their behavior,
and the reputational losses that they would have suffered from deviation, would have usually been enough to keep them in line. It was
exactly that position that I took to explain why informal sanctions
keep promises alive in cooperative endeavors.' 11 But new entrants
are not seeking to cooperate with the established parties. They wish
to enter into competition with them. My responses to Lee's point
thus carry over to this context as well. If one cannot rely on informal
sanctions to keep a cartel alive, so too one cannot rely on informal
sanctions to keep competitors in line when their interest is to hire
from the very pool of labor that the established parties wish to keep
down in their places.
McAdams thinks that I fall into deep contradiction by appealing
to informal norms in ordinary contracts while doubting their efficacy
between strangers."12 But he totally misstates the meaning of Ramseyer & Nakazato when he writes: "First, Ramseyer & Nakazato

107. Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 105, at 286-87.
108. Id. at 287. The full sentence read: "Nevertheless, most societies contain marginal people who effectively play the endgame." Id.
109. Id. at 265-66.
110. Id. at 263.
111. Forbidden Grounds, supra note 1, at 69-70.
112. McAdams, supra note 11, at 259-61.

studied the effect of social norms on disputes between strangers; although Epstein does not mention it, they expressly qualify their results as apply only to such disputes, expressly contrasting the work
of Ellickson"113 - who by implication does not.
It's just sloppy scholarship. The relevant passage in Ramseyer &
Nakazato reads in full: "First, this article deals only with disputes
between strangers. Although we believe that the same narrow, shortterm self-interest often drives the bargaining process between Japanese who deal with each other on a repeated basis, we postpone the
more complex issue to another paper.""14 In a footnote, the authors
then amplified this theme: "Many. scholars have suggested, for example, that where people deal with each other on an ongoing basis,
they may not structure their relations according to legal rules." 15 It
was a proposition that they did not investigate, but which they certainly did not accept.
Ramseyer then conducted that second study, 1 6 where he indeed
concluded that the legal norms play a much more important place in
structuring banking relationships than the traditional culture-bound
accounts of Japanese law suggest. "In short, for all the good will and
Confucianism, and for all the reputational capital and repeated
deals, firms enter the Japanese banking world at their peril. In this
community, self-interest generally reigns; legal rules often shape the
arrangements that firms strike; and noncooperative strategies remain
feared threats.""'
At this point it is fairly straightforward to understand why Ellickson's work on informal norms does little violence to the basic thesis
of Forbidden Grounds. Ellickson's study deals with a variety of
harms caused by cattle: cattle damage to nearby property, building
boundary fences, and litigation arising out of collisions between livestock and automobiles on the public highway. The first two involve
repeat interactions within a small community, and usually the
amounts of damages are relatively small, at least in comparison to
major personal injury suits. Where there are repeat players who operate in environments where parties are uncertain whether they will
be future plaintiffs or future defendants, there is a strong tendency
for the emergence of efficient customary norms - a point that I
have stressed in my own writings on the importance of custom in

113. Id. at 259-60.
114. Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 105, at 265.
115. Id. at 265 n.6 (citations omitted).
116. See J. Mark Ramseyer, Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the
Shadow of Defection in Japan, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 91 (1991).
117. Id. at 93.
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setting tort standards of care. 18 The cattle interactions that Ellickson describes fit nicely into that model, except perhaps for highway
accidents which are less likely to involve local citizens. In addition,
the norms that he observes - chiefly a strict liability for cattle trespass in both open and close-ranges" 19 - mimic those of the tort law,
and do not require any subtle cooperative behavior between the parties. The cultural norms, therefore, are not seeking to accomplish a
very ambitious task (e.g., telling farmers how to raise and tend to
their own cattle), and there is little incentive for anyone to deviate
from the collective solutions once they are in place. And it surely
helps that these persons cooperate in many other activities as well.
All this is a far cry from what happens with a new entrant into a
community who wants to keep the established culture and society at
a distance and open up new entrepreneurial opportunities. These entrants are quite happy to defy the local norms, and do not even have
to go through the trouble of litigation to make their point. So long as
the new entrant is able to keep the competitors at a distance, and
pick his trading partners, he does not have to worry about the dominant local folkways if these are expressed only in the form of social
and cultural sanctions. He can establish his own ways of doing business and prosper because of the opportunities left open by the business strategies taken by the dominant group. This difference in
context must have been apparent to the dominant forces in the
South, for why should they invest in extensive legal structures if informal cultural norms are sufficient to discipline outsiders who want
to go their separate ways?
The patterns of behavior in the Old South, however, did not rest
simply on a mix of social sanctions and formal legal barriers to entry. They also rested on another approach that was often less subtle
and more effective: private violence, which everyone acknowledges
had a powerful role to play in the South. If you wanted to open up a
textile plant that hires black workers, and thus reduce their availability for other jobs, then you had to take with it the risk that your
tires would be slashed, and your wife and children would be molested on the street, in the schools, and at the movie theater. The
responsive system of local justice would simply turn a blind eye on
the complaint, so that no redress could be had through the courts
under its race neutral tort and criminal law statutes. Any outsider,
118. Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History
of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 11-16 (1992).
119. Of Coase and Cattle, supra note 106, at 672-74.

any carpetbagger, who came into the South had to run that risk,
given that entry into the market also meant physical entry into the
local community. In the face of these pressures, how could one argue
that the system of social customs and mores was sufficient to the
task? Surely, the Southerners did not think so, for if they did, then
why should they engage in coercive practices, both legal and off the
books, in order to control the migration and employment of black
labor? The image that one has of Southern labor markets at the
time when the civil rights laws were passed is one of markets that
were dominated by coercion and restraint. Would the case for federal intervention have been as compelling if laissez-faire had been
the order of the day?
Over and over again the critics of markets generally insist that
markets operate within the framework of broader social structures
that protect private property and make voluntary exchange possible:
effective markets require stable social institutions. How many times
have we been told that there are no pre-political legal rights or prepolitical institutions not by Thomas Jefferson, but by modern critics
of natural law? 12 0 But the proposition works in reverse: corrupt state
institutions can sharply curtail the effectiveness of voluntary markets. When personal liberty is not protected, when property rights
may be violated at will, when contracts are subject to the whimsical
interpretation of local officials, when the sheriff is in cahoots with
local thugs, people will cower and markets will behave accordingly.
With these pervasive and corrupt background conditions, it becomes
highly improbable that local customs and norms were sufficient to
maintain white dominance, segregation, and the wholesale exclusion
of blacks from certain trades, without a healthy assist from both
public and private force. Why would Southerners resort to all these
grisly tactics if the cultural sanctions were sufficient under the day?
The emphasis in the study of Southern institutions should be to identify the coercive mechanisms of social control; it should not be to
insist that none was used. And lest one pine away for the nonexistent
Civil Rights Act of 1910, ask whether it could have been passed
when it was most needed.
120. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 19 (1990) ("Seeing the common law status quo as prelegal

and neutral, judges (and many others) did not recognize its principles as part of a regulatory system at all, but regarded them instead as the state of nature."). I know of no
nineteenth century judge who took this position. There were many nineteenth century
judges who regarded the common law rules as just, and legislative interference as occasionally tyrannical, as Justice Peckham himself did in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905). If more judges had taken his position, then we might have been spared the mischief of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), which of course sustained extensive legislative interference with
market behavior under an exaggerated account of the police power. See FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 98-108.
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But what about the North? Here there is no question that substantial amounts of racial hostility existed as well. But again it
would be a mistake to suggest that there were no other pressures
that constrained the operation of labor markets. Private violence is
always an option. And while it probably was not practiced in the
same thoroughgoing manner as in the South, it surely reared its
head in the North. There were common instances of violence against
other recent immigrants, such as Jews and Italians. It certainly was
directed against blacks, especially those blacks who threatened to
take jobs away from whites. In addition, there were doubtless other
legal constraints at work, both direct and indirect. Bernstein's article
repeatedly notes that the licensing laws were used to exclude black
labor in the North as well as the South.12' It seems clear that the
Davis-Bacon Act' 22 passed in 1931 was designed to protect white
construction workers against wage competition supplied by itinerant
black crews coming up from the South. 123 And the existence of
white-only (or grandfather clauses) in unions protected by state monopoly power under the National Labor Relations Act 24 gave an
opportunity to vent discriminatory impulses as well. Finally, it is perhaps possible that other land use, sewer, water, and similar forms of
regulation could be used in some communities to keep in line firms
that sought to hire black labor. The political sentiment and political
power in the North was less unified than in the South, so that these
forces were weaker, and the extensive out-migration from the South
in the face of legal obstacles, showed that many blacks from the Old
South voted with their feet.
Even if public regulation and private violence could be completely
curbed, there is nothing that says that competitive markets would
eliminate all vestiges of discrimination in labor markets. But one has
to be very careful to measure the nature and extent of the discrimination that does remain. I cannot pretend to have made any exhaustive study of the day-to-day practices of discrimination in the North,
to see whether the dominant patterns were consistent with the basic
positions that I took in Forbidden Grounds. But it is instructive in
this regard to look at one case that was regarded as a counter-example to my basic proposition that competition erodes the impact of
121. Bernstein, supra note 77.
122. Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 276a to 276a-5 (West 1986).
123. See, e.g., Civil Rights, supra note 93.
124. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-69 (West 1973-1978 &
Supp. 1994).

private discrimination in unregulated markets. At the Conference
Professor Michael Gottesman mentioned that I had not even discussed particular instances of discrimination in the North, and offered United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation20 to show the
pervasive nature of private discrimination in the North, in this instance in Bethlehem's huge Lackawanna facility. Bethlehem Steel
was a case that he should have known well because he represented
the three locals of the United Steelworkers of America (Locals 2601,
2602, and 2603) who were joined as codefendants in the case for
their part in the perpetuation of the practices of discrimination
found in the Bethlehem Plant and who were aware of the local discriminatory practices. 126
A simple look at the caption on the case shows therefore that this
is not a case of discrimination in an unregulated market. For this
reason alone the case oddly confirms my basic thesis that discrimination is the source of massive difficulties where entry is not free. Indeed, in this case it is not quite clear exactly how much of the
discrimination is attributable to the firm, and how much to the various locals who maintained separate seniority lists for the protection
of their individual members, doubtless in part for reasons unrelated
to discrimination. To be sure, it is easy to find statements that could
easily be taken as crude excuses for racial bigotry: thus the Bethlehem supervisor who announced that blacks were assigned to work
the coke ovens because "Negroes could better stand heat than
whites.' 27 But the sentiments of a single employee, however
deplorable, cannot account for the complex web of employment practices that spans well over twenty years, and which involves a seniority system in widespread use at steel plants throughout the country
on the strength of general custom and usage.'"2 Here it appears that
the plant was unionized from the early 1950s, and perhaps as early
as 1944.129 The three rival unions created a more complex bargain-

ing setting than the usual single-union monopoly type situation. The
125. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F. Supp. 977 (W.D.N.Y. 1970),
modified and remanded, 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
126. Id. at 980. The opinion states that the Union was aware of the discrimination
from at least 1961, which was sufficient to fasten onto it any liability under the 1964
Act. Id. But the Union had to have known of the practices from the first day. It is also
unclear as to how much it supported them. There is no such thing as "the" union interest, and doubtless there were all sorts of fights over the extent to which the discrimination should be fostered or discouraged inside the plant.
127. Id. at 979.
128. There were 285 lines of progression in the Plant. Id. at 982. The general
establishment of lines of progression preceded the formation of the union, operating as a
matter of custom and usage between the company and the employees. When the union
came on the scene, it accepted the existing structure. Every functionally integrated steel
plant in the United States has a multiple-unit system.
129. Note that there was an industry-wide agreement between union and all firms
on job classification that was approved by the National War Labor Board in November,
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steering of black workers to inferior jobs could well have been a response to pressure from union membership as well as a response to
employer preference. As befits the general complexity of the situation, it seems as though sentiment inside the union was divided on
the question of whether the discriminatory practices should have
been maintained within the framework of the preexisting seniority
system. There were union efforts to ease the barriers to transfer
across divisions that were, it appears, opposed by the industry on a
general basis in the decade before the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. The reasons why each side took the position it did are
not clear. But as these negotiations were undertaken at a national
level, it is hard to infer any direct connection between the overall
practices in the firm and the level of discrimination within a particular plant.
In addition, Bethlehem Steel failed to provide any data on wage
levels in the various divisions. There is some hint that some workers
in the least attractive divisions earned higher wages than workers in
the more preferred division, because there was some reluctance to
transfer out of these divisions owing to a short-term cut in pay. 180 To
be sure, this differential was in part attributable to the accrual of
seniority on a unit by unit basis, and reflected the disparity of wages
on the different pay scales. Yet, by the same token, the size of these
differentials was not stated explicitly in the opinion; nor was there
any effort to correct the data to take into account other factors that
might influence the wage equation: the judge after all was more intent on establishing a violation of Title VII than in vindicating my
theories about the incidence and effect of discrimination. But with
all this said, no one could deny the persistence of discrimination,
which will have its proportionate influence in any market setting,
just as the claims for diversity do today. But the critical question is,
how long would those patterns have persisted if the firm and the
workers had been confronted with competitive pressures in an open
environment? And on that question Bethlehem Steel provides us
with no answers at all.

1944. Id. at 983.
130. Id. at 984. Note that there were no divisions in the Lackawanna plant with
all blacks and no whites; and there was no evidence of a racial disparity in wages within
divisions. The basic charge here was one of racial steering at the entry level.

VII.

WHERE

Do WE Go FROM

HERE

It is, perhaps, a mistake to dwell today on difficult cases that arise
out of the transition from the pre- to the post-civil rights environment. It is, however, instructive to ask what good the civil rights acts
have done for their intended beneficiaries? The civil rights acts have
now been in effect for over thirty years, and they have produced two
different types of reaction. The first is the impassioned call for their
continued and vigorous enforcement, at least as regards the various
protected classes. Yet at the same time there is a deep disillusionment over the possible benefits of any such enforcement. If one were
to look for tangible economic signs of the overall benefits of the Civil
Rights Act, it would be difficult for one to find them. Without question there is more race-consciousness today than there was, say,
twenty years ago; but the levels of distrust in racial relations, in
some quarters at least, have become higher, not lower. On the economic front the relative strong growth rates between 1946 and 1964
slowed considerably after 1964 - due in large part, no doubt, to the
heavy level of regulation and taxation of the employment relation.
The Civil Rights Act is one component in that system of regulation,
even though it would be foolhardy to regard it as the sole, or even
the dominant, source of economic dislocation of the past thirty years.
Minimum wage laws, licensing requirements, and high taxes are all
worthy rivals to the civil rights laws in the creation of deadweight
social losses.
But what is more apparent is that the current policies seem to
leave little hope to exit from the situation. The critical problems with
black labor take place before those young people make it into the
labor force. There is no substitute for a good education (itself correlated with stable family structure), especially as more and more jobs
require an ability to obtain some technical skills and ability before
entering the work force. No civil rights law will protect those who
cannot enter the labor force because they have criminal records or
are habitual drug users. If blacks are not able to make it into the
labor market at the entry level owing to high regulatory and tax
barriers, then they will be shut out of the critical on-the-job training
that will allow them to take the next step forward in labor markets,
and the massive resentment and political instability of our inner cities will surely increase. It is not a pretty set of prospects. Yet the
thought that any vigorous enforcement of the civil rights acts in the
next decade will generate any gains, either for blacks or the economy
as a whole, is sheer illusion.
Worse still, there are other forms of regulation that can make
matters worse. Part of my opposition to the ADEA and the ADA is
that both make it harder for employers to create jobs for young
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workers of limited skills. If old positions only open up slowly and if
firms are forced to pay enormous sums to hire and train disabled
workers, some portion of this cost, perhaps a disproportionate share
of this cost, will be paid by marginal workers whom these same employers will have to let go, or at least reduce their wages or benefits.
If (or perhaps as) the total burden of regulation on the employment
relationship becomes too great, there will be a shift (such as the one
that is already taking place) away from large firms that are easily
regulated into smaller firms and solo entrepreneurs who do business
in spot markets as independent contractors, one step further removed
from the civil rights laws.
What can be proposed to handle this situation? The Civil Rights
Act of 1991,131 with its beefed up remedies, may create some lucky
winners in the litigation lottery, but it will do nothing to undo the
systematic weaknesses in the current system of labor law. So the
question is whether one can devise any clever system that will undo
the worst effects of the statute. One has been proposed in a number
of different places: Professor Derrick Bell has written bitterly of The
Racial Preference Licensing Act; 32 my colleague David Strauss has
made much the same proposal; 33 and its most systematic economic
elaboration came from Robert Cooter in his Article for the Symposium. 3 4 Some sense of the merits of the arguments come from the
analogies that are used to render it more plausible. Total prohibition
of the drug trade is frightfully expensive; so it might be useful to
permit its use and to tax the gains from sale. Pollution is a clear
wrong, but it too cannot be prohibited entirely in a productive economy. First set the level of pollution that is to be tolerated and then
allow trading of the pollution rights: if the external harms are kept
constant, then the trades should increase social welfare by allowing a
larger output for any given level of pollution. Treat discrimination on
the grounds of race (or indeed any other) as of equal social status
with pollution, and it may well be that the intermediate position of
taxation or tradable quotas is desirable.' 3 5
131. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
132. DERRICK BELL, The Racial Preference Licensing Act, in FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 47 (1992).

133. See David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discriminationin
America: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEo. L.J. 1619 (1991).
134. Cooter, supra note 59.
135. The differences between the tax and the quota system largely arise from imperfect knowledge. In principle any quota (X percent of Y workers for a given class of
firms), should allow firms to buy and sell rights, so that the protected workers are hired

Yet the difficulties with this system are so great that it will die of
its own weight. First, the political resistance to a conscious scheme
of quotas or taxes would be unbearable: no one wants to have a public declaration that it is possible to monetize the level of disadvantage within the market. And within the firm the symbolic effects are
likely to be disastrous, for white workers (or whoever is not protected
under the quota) will ask time and again why there should not be
equal pay for equal work. Needless to say, moreover, the system will
not work evenly on the regulated firms. It may well be that a hightech computer firm will find it far harder to reach its quota, or to
avoid these taxes, than will a construction firm. And the locational
variations in population for any national system will clearly require
major adjustments as well, for it is hard to see how the targets that
are realistic for a firm in Atlanta or New York are sensible for one
in Salt Lake City or Minneapolis. Nor will internal management or
promotion be easy under the preference system: if two workers are
taken in, one with the preference and the other without, what is to
be done to bonuses, perquisites, and a thousand other tactics to create differential wages to offset some of the imbalance wrought by the
preference in the first place? Does the preference created on the
ground floor continue as workers progress through the ranks, or can
the state requirement be met solely by hiring the "right" number of
each kind of worker?
The objections to a state-imposed system of quotas are too strong
even in the current environment, and they are only marginally softened by making the obligation transferable or dischargeable with tax
revenues. That is how it should be unless someone can show ways in
which a state-mandated system of quotas, taxes or other preferences
outperforms a plain old ordinary market. The basic choice echoes
John F. Kennedy's famous expression: A rising tide raises all boats.
That is open competition. But the correlative proposition is that a
falling tide leaves many boats grounded. That is the modern civil
rights laws.

at the end in the firms in which they cause the least dislocation. A system of quotas sets
the target that each firm should reach and then allows a market to determine the value
of the tradable rights. With a tax and subsidy system the government does not allow a
private market to set the price for each slot. It sets the price itself and then observes the
number of firms that prefer to pay the tax to hiring the workers protected under the law.
In most schemes of this sort the proceeds from the tax are then distributed by way of
subsidy to those firms who are prepared to hire protected workers in excess of the quotas.
In principle it should be possible to set a tax to induce any level of hiring. In a frictionless world, therefore, it should not make a difference whether the tax is used to induce
the quota, or the quota is used to set the appropriate transfer price. In a world with
friction both systems are likely to go astray in unpredictable ways.

